TAKING RISKS WITH PEACE IN BURUNDI
IGNORING GOOD PRACTICE IN CIVILIAN DISARMAMENT

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About the Peacebuilding Centre
The Centre consolidates good practice for peacebuilding and human security, compiled over many years by multiple peacebuilding experts and practitioners, and focuses on assembling operational tools. Its purpose is to make it easier for peacebuilding practitioners to find practical approaches to engage with fragile states, conduct Early Warning–Early Response assessments to address root causes of conflict, and to design conflict-sensitive approaches for programming in fragile states. It brings together international experts for capacity building workshops, and maintains a web site of peacebuilding good practice at http://peacebuildingcentre.com
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Since I was based in Bujumbura for 17 months, all told, the list of people I have to personally thank for their contribution to this work is long. Fortunately for me, Burundians from all walks of life in some way or another informed my thinking or contributed directly to the research, including members of government, national and international NGO staff, consultants, teachers, security guards, domestic workers and cab drivers. I was a member of a dynamic community of expatriate workers that also contributed their insights and experiences, including those in Burundi with donor agencies, the UN, the diplomatic service, NGOs, and the private sector. Special thanks to the Centre d’Alerte et de Prévention des Conflits, and its Director, Charles Ndayiziga, and to Susan Brown in Ottawa, always there to support me with her knowledge and expertise.

DEDICATION

This report is dedicated to the memory of my good friend and fellow Bujumbura resident, Emmanuel Rejouis who, along with two of his daughters, died in the earthquake in Port-au-Prince, on Tuesday 12 January 2010.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The pursuit of peace is a noble calling. Substantial resources are invested in war’s aftermath, but sustainable socio-economic development doesn’t occur without peace and stability. Donors have reached consensus on good practice on a host of peacebuilding challenges, yet the approach to civilian disarmament in Burundi affirms that lessons of the past have not been learned. A brief civilian disarmament campaign had modest results. Prospects for additional disarmament are dim. There is little awareness in Burundi programming of OECD / DAC Guidelines or other documented good practice on security-related issues. This report provides a "report card" on the performance of donor and NGO programming on civilian disarmament in Burundi (see Table 8.1) and provides a sobering assessment of how lessons are not learned.

Institutional capacity-building of the national civilian disarmament authority is critical, and linked to issues of national ownership, better harmonization and coordination between actors, inclusion of youth and rebel associates, and meaningful involvement of civil society organizations. Reintegration has largely failed, and future activities need to be based on established good policy and practice if sustainable peace is to be found.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The 1993 – 2006 civil war and post-conflict period in Burundi

In the morning of 21 October 1993, Melchior Ndadaye, Burundi’s first democratically elected and first Hutu president, was executed along with numerous senior government officials by elements of the Tutsi-dominated army. The Ndadaye government had barely lasted 100 days in office, and with the killings, Burundi’s record of recurrent political violence since its independence in July 1962 continued unabated. Within hours, the situation had spiraled out of control and inter-ethnic massacres had taken place in various parts of the country (Ndarishikanye, 1999). By late 2003, after a decade of civil war pitting Hutu rebel groups against the Tutsi-dominated army, Burundi was ruined. More than 300,000 people had been killed and more than a million had been either internally displaced or had fled to neighbouring countries (Scoulier, 2008).¹

¹ This was not the first time in its history that so many Burundians had been killed in political violence. For a summary and chronology of Burundi’s recurrent cycles of political violence since independence in July 1962, see Vandeginste, 2007, and Brachet and Wolpe, 2005.
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The post-conflict transitional period began on 28 August 2000 when nineteen negotiating parties signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. At the time many observers viewed the Arusha Agreement with derision, calling it “just an agreement between Bujumbura politicians” because the two major rebel Hutu factions, the CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL, refused to participate or sign, and continued the fight (Rieff, 2001).2 Nevertheless, as stipulated in the Arusha Agreement and in spite of numerous setbacks, a transitional constitution was adopted in October 2001, a power-sharing government was installed in November 2001 and a transitional parliament in January 2002. Against most expectations, in November 2003 the CNDD-FDD – but not the Palipehutu-FNL – signed a peace agreement and joined the transitional government (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005).

Burundi’s transitional period ended in mid-2005 with a series of electoral processes that were deemed by the international community to be transparent and fair.3 The clear winner of these elections was the Hutu-dominated CNDD and on 26 August 2005, CNDD Chairman Pierre Nkurunziza took the oath of office for a five-year term, officially ending the transitional period (International Crisis Group, 2006). Remarkably, after more than a decade of internecine war, and four decades of recurring political and ethnic violence, a former rebel group had succeeded in winning political power through the ballot box despite the opposition of a small yet dominant elite within the Tutsi minority that had controlled the state since independence.4

In support of the peace process and transitional period, the African Union deployed the African Union Mission to Burundi (AMIB) between June 2003 and June 2004. AMIB was succeeded by the Opération des Nations Unies pour le Burundi (ONUB) between June 2004 and December

2 CNDD-FDD, Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie and its armed wing, the Forces pour la défense de la démocratie, were founded in June 1994 by Léonard Nyangoma, a former minister in the Ndadaye government, months after the civil war had begun. It was the major Hutu rebel group during the war. Palipehutu-FNL, Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu, and its armed wing Front national pour la libération, was an older Hutu organization formed in the late 1970s (Vandeginste, 2007). Between August 2000 and November 2003 smaller rebel groups, including splinter groups of the CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL, joined the transition, but not the main organizations.
3 Nation-wide municipal elections were held on 3 June, national assembly elections were held on 4 June, the indirect senate elections were held on 29 July, and finally the indirect presidential elections by the National Assembly and Senate were held on 19 August 2005 (Reynjens, 2005).
4 Only 14% of the Burundian population is Tutsi; the vast majority – 85% – is ethnically Hutu. Twa (pygmies) make up the remaining 1%. There are 3,000 Europeans as well as 2,000 South Asians in the country. See the CIA World Fact Book at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html.
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2006. ONUB was terminated by the Burundian government, which requested that the Operation, including its humanitarian components, leave the country. For some observers this revealed a significant gap between the perceptions of the international community, on the one hand, emphasizing the role of ONUB in conducting elections and in helping the country to stabilize, and on the other hand, the perceptions of members of the Nkurunziza government, who saw it as an occupying force that should leave as soon as possible (Zeebroek, 2005). Following negotiations between the government and the United Nations, on 1 January 2007 ONUB was replaced by the Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi (BINUB). BINUB had an ambitious mandate, supporting the Government of Burundi in peace consolidation and democratic governance, in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former rebel combatants, and reform of the security sector, the promotion and protection of human rights and measures to end impunity, as well as donor and UN agency coordination (BINUB, 2008). BINUB had a major joint program with the government on security sector reform and small arms, one of whose goals was to support government efforts for a reduction in the circulation of small arms and light weapons through an efficient civilian disarmament program (BINUB, 2008). Civilian disarmament projects of the joint program were funded through the UN Peacebuilding Fund (BINUB, 2008).

In addition to BINUB, bilateral donors, notably Belgium and the Netherlands, also are supporting the government in the security sector including civilian disarmament, and work with the police and military. Some international non-governmental organizations (NGO) such as Mines Advisory Group and Danish Church Aid are or were active in civilian disarmament and in the security sector, while the national NGO Centre d’Alerte et de Prévention des Conflits (CENAP) is active in research on the security sector and civilian disarmament.

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5 Imposed by regional leaders, it was the first time in its history that the Burundian military and Tutsi elite had allowed peacekeeping forces in Burundi (Reyntjens, 2005). Under South African leadership, ONUB included 5,000 military, 200 military observers, 120 police, and 443 civilians (BINUB, 2008).

6 BINUB was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1719 on 25 October 2006. It had some 470 civilian posts (BINUB, 2008).

7 BINUB was additionally mandated to address the structural root causes and consequences of conflict and strengthen national capacities. It was to assist the government to (a) stabilize the security situation, (b) promote good governance and ensure that the political gains of the 2005 Constitution were sustained and built upon, (c) address other root causes of conflict, including human rights violations, impunity and land disputes, and promote national reconciliation, and (d) enhance national capacities and plan and implement reconstruction and development activities to ensure that the population benefitted from tangible peace dividends (BINUB, 2008).
In early September 2006, under massive diplomatic pressure including the threat of severe regional and international sanctions, Burundi’s last active rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL, signed a ceasefire agreement with the CNDD government in Dar es Salaam (Van Eck, 2007). Nevertheless fighting between FNL and government forces continued for many months, including in the capital in April 2008. Only in December 2008 did the government and Palipehutu-FNL manage to reach an agreement to implement the September 2006 ceasefire agreement, and in mid-April 2009, Burundian history was made when the Palipehutu-FNL agreed to permanently lay down its arms, becoming the forty-second political party registered in the country (International Crisis Group, 2009).

The need to focus on civilian disarmament in the post-conflict period is clear. After so many years of conflict the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a major security issue in Burundi. Both the army and rebel groups handed out weapons to civilian self-defence groups and militias in significant numbers, some going back to previous crises in the 1970s and 1980s. Over the years, weapons were also sourced via porous borders from the Democratic Republic of Congo, from Rwanda and Tanzania (Rackley, 2005).

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8 Thus, for most observers, the civil war is considered to have begun in 1993 and ended in 2006.
9 Dropping any reference to ethnicity in its name, in keeping with the 2005 post-Arusha Constitution, was a key condition for the registration of the rebel group as a political party. It is now known simply as FNL.
There are no precise figures on the number of small arms or light weapons (SALW) in the hands of civilians in the country, though it is universally recognized that their presence and misuse is a serious problem. A 2007 report by the Small Arms Survey estimated that there were at least 100,000 small arms and/or light weapons in circulation, based on an estimate of the minimum number of households possessing at least one weapon: 100,000 households. There are doubts about this and any other figure for SALW in circulation in Burundi, however for most Burundians surveyed, small arms used in violent crime are the principal source of insecurity, and most violent crime indeed has been carried out with small arms in recent years (Pézard and Florquin, 2007).

1.2 Purpose, objectives and research questions
The purpose of this research was to assess the degree to which civilian disarmament programming in Burundi is following policy guidelines issued by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as well as established good practice.

The Objectives were:

(i) To document civilian disarmament initiatives by national and international actors in Burundi;

(ii) To assess to what degree those initiatives are following OECD policy guidelines, and the reasons underlying that; and,

(iii) To compare and contrast those initiatives with established good practice from previous interventions in Africa and elsewhere.

The research questions were:

(i) What are the reasons and circumstances underlying the degree to which civilian disarmament programming in Burundi is following policy guidelines and established good practice?

(ii) What are the unique factors influencing civilian disarmament in Burundi, if any, in comparison to initiatives elsewhere? and,

(iii) Are there new lessons for good policy and good practice arising from the Burundi case study?
1.3 Methodology

Program and project documents were obtained in Bujumbura from national and international actors including government, the United Nations, donors and NGOs involved in civilian disarmament and the security sector.

Semi-structured, open-ended interviews were carried out in Bujumbura with representatives of those institutions and programs involved in civilian disarmament and the security sector. Media articles dealing with SALW, civilian disarmament, and the security sector were collected for the period June 2007 – October 2009.

1.4 Key Terms and Concepts

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. As noted in its publications, the Paris-based OECD is the forum where governments of thirty-one democracies compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice, and work to coordinate domestic and international policies (OECD, 2009). The OECD has a number of specialized committees to carry out its work; since the mid-1990s the OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) through its Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC) has been working to assist donors and developing country partners to increase the effectiveness of their efforts to prevent conflict and improve security in its broadest sense (OECD, 2004). The central mechanism for coordination amongst donors and developing country partners has been the development of a series of guidelines designed to orient donors in their aid policies related to security issues, with the first one issued in 1997 (Bryden, 2007). It is important to note that the guidelines represent a consensus reached amongst donors. OECD DAC guidelines on security-related matters are central to this research project.

10 See Appendix C for a list of acronyms used in this report.
11 The thirty-one OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The European Commission also participates. Chile was the latest country to join the OECD, depositing its instrument of ratification in May 2010.
12 The OECD DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation includes the major bilateral donors – Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States; the European Commission, UNDP (representing the UN), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank (Bryden, 2007).
Small arms and light weapons. The definition of small arms and light weapons issued by the 1997 UN Panel on Governmental Experts is used in this research project. A small arm or light weapon is any man-portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive. Generally speaking, small arms are those weapons designed for personal use, and light weapons are those designed for use by several persons working as a crew (United Nations, 1997, in GTZ, 2001). The impact of the uncontrolled presence of SALW in developing, post-conflict, and fragile states has been well documented and will not be discussed here.

Civilian disarmament. Particularly in post-conflict sub-Saharan Africa, the “civilian” in civilian disarmament is necessarily a fuzzy concept that may include a number of actors – since, as researchers at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue note, long gone are the days when armed conflict involved clearly defined opposing lines of armed forces clearly differentiated from unarmed and uninvolved civilians (Buchanan and Widmer, 2006). Conflict today involves a range of armed actors other than traditional soldiers, for example, civil defence forces, militias (political, ethnic, religious), paramilitaries, criminal groups, armed gangs, child soldiers and mercenaries, and perhaps inadequately demobilized and reintegrated combatants from previous conflicts including, particularly in the African context, combatants from neighbouring states. All of these may possess or retain weapons after armed conflict has ended. Other individuals may own guns not acquired during war, but for self-defence, for securing a livelihood, or for reasons of status or prestige (Small Arms Survey, 2003). Broadly speaking, civilian disarmament in this research project deals with disarming those individuals who possess SALW and who are additionally not under state control (Buchanan and Widmer, 2006).

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13 Small arms include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, and light machine-guns. Light weapons include heavy machine-guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of calibers of less than 100 mm. Ammunition and explosives include cartridges (rounds) for small arms, shells and missiles for light weapons, mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems, anti-personnel and anti-tank hand grenades, landmines, and explosives (United Nations, 1997, in GTZ, 2001).
Small arms control. Small arms control is the broader concept that includes civilian disarmament and additionally (OECD, 2007a):

(i) The development of laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise control over the production, export, import and transit of SALW;
(ii) Programs to improve the management and security of stockpiles of SALW and ammunition and explosives held by the police, military and other forces authorized by the state;
(iii) The destruction of SALW and related ammunition and explosives deemed surplus to national security;
(iv) Public awareness campaigns on SALW as well voluntary collection and destruction programs; and,
(v) Promotion of regional and sub-regional cooperation and information exchange to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW.

The fragile state. In a fragile state, state structures lack the political will or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development, or to safeguard the physical security and human rights of their population (OECD, 2009).14 It is not only the will or capacity that is weak or absent, but also the orientation of state action that is in question – whether state strategies respond to real or perceived security needs of people, and by thus responding, whether those strategies strengthen the legitimacy of state institutions. The OECD emphasizes not only a bottom-up focus on security needs and perceptions of people and their communities impacted by armed violence, but also the importance of political processes to negotiate state-society relations as a starting point for state-building (OECD, 2009; OECD, 2007b).

Human security. For centuries, security has been equivalent to “national security”, and focused on the ways that state structures and practices addressed threats to its sovereignty: threats to territorial integrity, issues related to political stability, military and defence arrangements, and economic or financial activities (Jolly and Ray, 2006). Arising after the end of the Cold War, human security is a fundamental re-conceptualization of the term that places the individual, and not the state, at the centre of attention – he or she is paramount, and the state is a collective

14 See DFID (2005) “Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states,” p.8, for indicative features of fragile states, as well as a list of fragile states prepared by the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA).
instrument to protect human life and enhance human welfare (Thakur, in BICC, 2006). The 2003 Report of the Commission on Human Security noted that human security entailed protecting people from critical and pervasive threats (UNOCHA, 2006), which, broadly speaking, include threats to socio-economic and political conditions, food, health, environmental, community and personal safety (Jolly and Ray, 2006). Human security is essentially an analytical tool which in practice, as it is applied to a specific context, focuses on a number of insecurities that are deemed priorities in that context: for example, human security interventions might not deal with the same threats to people when carried out in Afghanistan, Malawi, and Venezuela.

In this research, the focus is on the community and personal safety aspect of human security. More specifically, human security or security is used in the sense of protection from real and perceived threats from armed violence. Freedom from fear of armed violence is particularly important for the poor and other vulnerable groups in fragile contexts, because where there are inefficient police forces, weak justice systems and corrupt militaries, it is the poor and vulnerable who suffer most from fear, personal insecurity and violent crime (OECD, 2007a).

**Armed violence.** Armed violence is the use, or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death or psychosocial harm, and which undermines development (OECD, 2009).

**The Armed Violence Lens.** The armed violence lens is an analytical framework issued by the OECD in 2009, with the purpose of understanding the local context where armed violence occurs, including the context-specific drivers, structural and proximate risk factors, protective factors and effects, the interrelationships between drivers, risk factors and protective factors, as well as opportunities for interventions that enhance the reduction of armed violence. The armed violence lens (AVL) has four core elements and according to the OECD all four ought to be taken into account when designing armed violence reduction interventions (OECD, 2009):

(i) The people affected and their communities – it is critical to understand who is being affected by armed violence, where, when, how and why;\(^{15}\)

(ii) The perpetrators of armed violence and their motives – a clear understanding of who they are, their motivations and ways they are organized, as well as a diagnosis of structural and proximate risk factors;

\(^{15}\) This requires mapping the geographic and temporal patterns of armed violence, as well as the demographic characteristics of those affected in order to identify how armed violence impacts specific groups and individuals.
(iii) The instruments of armed violence focusing on their demand, supply, and availability; and,
(iv) The wider formal and informal institutional environment that enables or protects against armed violence.\(^\text{16}\)

There are four levels of engagement in the AVL framework:

(i) **The national level** – national-level factors including historical trends that shape armed violence are identified at this level, and so are factors that influence program responses including the willingness of national authorities to address armed violence, and the capacities of state institutions.

(ii) **The local level** – depending on the context it can refer to a district, municipality, city, village, community or neighbourhood. An in-depth analysis at the local level is required for an understanding of the specific causal, risk and protective factors, their interrelationships, and opportunities for intervention.

(iii) **The regional** – in the case of Burundi, east and central Africa.

(iv) **The global** – The regional and global levels and their connections to the national and local levels need to be taken into account. For example, how external factors such as international demand for illegal or illicit commodities, as well as regional and global arms flows may have strong repercussions at the national and local level. Attention must be paid to how local level factors such as unemployment, political exclusion or personal insecurity are entry points for external influences.

For the OECD, the complex interplay of local, national, regional and global factors that needs to be taken into account highlights the necessity of a “whole-of-government” approach, which is taken up in the next chapter. The armed violence lens is used in this research project to gain an understanding of the acquisition and use of SALW by Burundian civilians and to analyze current civilian disarmament and armed violence reduction interventions in Burundi.

**Reform of the security system.** The security system of a state includes the armed forces, the police and gendarmerie,\(^\text{17}\) intelligence services, and judicial and penal institutions, as well as

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\(^{16}\) This is a complex result that emerges from formal laws, informal norms and practices, means of enforcement and organizational structures in a particular context. Broader public security and justice sector issues, and problems of governance need to be considered.

\(^{17}\) In Francophone countries the gendarmerie, based on the French model, consists of professional and armed police forces, usually deployed in rural areas. They are part of the military forces and operate under military command, but have civilian duties (OECD, 2007a).
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civil authorities responsible for its control and oversight, for example, parliament, the executive, and defence ministry (OECD, 2004). Security system reform (SSR) seeks to increase the ability of the state to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency, and rule of law (OECD, 2004). In a fragile post-conflict state such as Burundi, the reform of the security system and its institutions, which historically have been a source of insecurity and injustice rather than security and justice, is of central importance in post-conflict state building and reconstruction.

*Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.* According to the Integrated DDR Standards, the three basic phases in the transition from being a member of an armed group to a civilian are

1. **Disarmament** – removing the weapons;\(^\text{18}\)
2. **Demobilization** – discharging combatants from their units;\(^\text{19}\) and,
3. **Reintegration** – the socio-economic process of becoming a civilian.\(^\text{20}\)

Disarmament often has additional “R’s” added to it, for resettlement or repatriation, and/or rehabilitation, a broader concept that involves ex-combatants and others in the community re-establishing a normal life with shelter, income, basic facilities and services, and so on (United Nations 2006, in Klem and Douma, 2008).

**Links between civilian disarmament, SSR and DDR.** According to the OECD, a safe and secure environment for people is the result of three interrelated activities (OECD, 2005):

1. The operational effectiveness of security forces per sé (e.g. effective crime prevention);
2. The democratic governance of the security system (i.e. in the post-conflict context as a result of SSR); and,
3. Key related activities such as civilian disarmament and DDR.

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\(^{18}\) In greater detail, the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosive and light and heavy weapons of combatants. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programs.

\(^{19}\) The first stage of demobilization involves the process of cantonment, the second usually includes a support package for reinsertion of the demobilized, prior to reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include food, clothes, shelter, medical services, training, agricultural tools, etc.

\(^{20}\) Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open timeframe and taking place at the local community level, whereby the former combatant gains sustainable employment and income. Reintegration more often than not requires long-term external assistance from donors.
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It is evident that SSR, DDR and civilian disarmament are mutually reinforcing and highly complementary. For example, effective SSR and DDR can play a critical role in enhancing personal and community security in post-conflict societies, and therefore in reducing civilian demand for small arms for protection, as well as the willingness of civilians to hand over small arms via voluntary programs. Conversely, where SSR and DDR are not generally deemed to be successful processes, civilian disarmament faces the significant barrier of public distrust of the security system, in addition to ongoing fears of armed violence.

1.5 Recapitulation

This research project focuses on civilian disarmament initiatives, taking place in the context of post-conflict reconstruction in a fragile African state, Burundi. Important issues linked to civilian disarmament such as small arms control, DDR and SSR are examined. Are good policy and good practice being followed in Burundi? Do insights for policy and practice emerge from this case study? A recent analytical tool, the OECD DAC “armed violence lens”, is used to assess civilian disarmament and related initiatives.

Children carrying firewood, Mwaro, August 2008 (Charlie Avendaño)
CHAPTER 2
CIVILIAN DISARMAMENT PROGRAMMING: CONSENSUS ON GOOD POLICY

2.1 Aid effectiveness in fragile states

In addition to policy guidelines specifically dealing with security-related activities, which are dealt with in subsequent sections of this chapter, donor-funded initiatives in countries such as Burundi should adhere to two OECD policy guidelines that have come to the fore in the 2000s: the principles for increasing aid effectiveness, and the principles for engaging in fragile states.

*Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.* Donors and developing countries have recognized that greater amounts of aid and other development resources are necessary in order for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to be met by 2015. In addition, donors and developing countries recognize that aid effectiveness itself has to be significantly improved in the context of significant scaling up of aid. In early 2005 the OECD DAC hosted a High-Level Forum on the subject, which issued the Paris Declaration, endorsed on 2 March 2005, an international agreement to which over one hundred ministers and head of agencies have adhered. It establishes global commitments for donor and partner countries to support more effective aid, based on recognition of and intent to address limitations in recipient country ownership, administrative capacity and accountability; and insufficient coordination of aid effort by donors (OECD, 2006; OECD, 2005b).

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21 The Millennium Development Goals were developed out of the Declaration issued at the United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000 in New York. There are eight goals, with 21 targets, and a series of measurable indicators for each target to be met by 2015. The eight goals are: To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; to achieve universal primary education; to promote gender equality and empower women; to reduce child mortality; to improve maternal health; to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; to ensure environmental sustainability; and to develop a global partnership for development. See www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ and http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Default.aspx.

22 The OECD noted in April 2010 that there has been a recent trend of increasing development assistance from OECD DAC members. In 2009, once debt relief was excluded, the rise in assistance was +6.8%, to $ 119.6 billion. The largest donors by volume were the UN, France, Germany, the UK, and Japan. Five countries exceeded the UN ODA target of 0.7% of GNI: Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden; however several donors decreased their assistance, in part due to the impact of the global financial crisis: Austria, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Canada. See http://www.oecd.org/document/11/0,3343,en_21571361_44315115_44981579_1_1_1_1,00.html

23 http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html
Burundi was one of the participating countries that endorsed the declaration. There are five principles and twelve indicators of progress to be measured nationally and monitored internationally, with targets stipulated for 2010 (OECD, 2005b).

The Principles of Aid Effectiveness are:

(i) **Ownership** – Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies and coordinate development actions.\(^{24}\)

(ii) **Alignment** – Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national development strategies, institutions and procedures.\(^{25}\)

(iii) **Harmonization** – Donors’ actions are more harmonized, transparent and collectively effective.\(^{26}\)

(iv) **Managing for results** – Managing resources and improving decision-making for results.\(^{27}\)

(v) **Mutual accountability** – Donors and partners are accountable for development results.\(^{28}\)

**Principles for good international engagement in fragile states.** According to the OECD, a sustainable exit from poverty and insecurity for fragile states must be driven by their own leadership, with international actors positively affecting outcomes by maximizing the impact of engagement and minimizing unintentional harm. To that end, in April 2007 the OECD put forth a number of principles for good international engagement in fragile states, intended to help international actors foster constructive engagement between national and international stakeholders in countries with problems of weak governance and conflict (OECD, 2007b).

\(^{24}\) The indicator for Principle 1 is: (1) Partners have operational development strategies.

\(^{25}\) The indicators for Principle 2 are: (2a) Reliable public financial management system are in place; (2b) Reliable procurement systems are in place; (3) Aid flows are aligned on national priorities; (4) Strengthened partner capacity by support through coordinated programs; (5a) Use of country public financial management system; (5b) Use of country procurement systems; (6) Strengthened partner capacity by avoiding parallel implementation structures; (7) Aid is more predictable by being released according to agreed schedules; and (8) Bilateral aid is untied.

\(^{26}\) The indicators for Principle 3 are: (9) Use of common arrangements or procedures with aid provided as program-based; (10a) Joint missions to the field; and (10a) Joint country analytical work.

\(^{27}\) The indicator for Principle 4 is: (11) The number of countries with transparent and monitorable performance assessment frameworks to assess progress against national development strategies and sector programs.

\(^{28}\) The indicator for Principle 5 is: (12) The number of partner countries that undertake mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments of progress on aid effectiveness including those in the Paris Declaration.
The Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States are:

(i) **Take context as the starting point** – recognizing the different constraints of capacity, political will and legitimacy in the specific context.

(ii) **Do no harm** – by basing international interventions on conflict and governance analysis, so as to avoid creating societal divisions and worsening corruption and abuse.

(iii) **Focus on state-building as the central objective** – international engagement needs to be concerted, sustained, and focused on building the relationship between state and society, by supporting the legitimacy and accountability of states by addressing issues of democratic governance, human rights, civil society engagement and peacebuilding; and by strengthening the capability of states to fulfill their core functions in order to reduce poverty.  

(iv) **Prioritize prevention** – which includes sharing risk analyses and looking beyond “quick-fix” solutions to address the root causes of state fragility, and strengthening indigenous capacities to prevent conflict.

(v) **Recognize the links between political, security and development objectives** – since the political, security, economic and social spheres are inter-dependent. It is important to recognize that there may be trade-offs between objectives, particularly in the short-term, necessitating a “whole-of-government” approach.

(vi) **Promote non-discrimination** as a basis for inclusive, stable societies, with gender equity, social inclusion and human rights consistently promoted. The participation of women, youth, minorities and other excluded groups should be included in state building and service delivery strategies from the outset.

The principles for good international engagement in fragile states aim to complement the principles set out in the Paris Declaration, however the OECD has noted that in fragile states, as donors support state building and delivery of basic services, the principles of harmonization, alignment and managing for results must be adapted to an environment of weak governance and capacity: donor commitments to the Paris Declaration must be balanced with those for good international engagement in fragile states (OECD, 2009; OECD, 2005b).

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29 Core functions include ensuring security and justice; mobilizing revenue; establishing an enabling environment for basic service delivery, strong performance and employment generation. Support in these areas in turn strengthens citizen confidence, trust and engagement with state institutions. Civil society has a key role in demanding good governance and in service delivery (OECD, 2007b).
Taking Risks With Peace in Burundi

The nature of the state in sub-Saharan Africa. A key observation regarding the nature of the state in Burundi needs to be made when thinking about state building principles and objectives. Generally speaking fragile states in sub-Saharan Africa do not now, and have not in the past, resembled strong states, such as those found at the present time in Western Europe, for example. Rather than the state as an “arbiter” that acts between civil society, the private sector, and political society, the state in sub-Saharan African countries is the principal source of economic and political power and not an arbiter between different interests (see Fatton, 1988). As Léonce Ndikumana notes the small ruling elite (from the Tutsi minority and only those from the southern provinces) essentially privatized the state, and through clientism, patronage, and rent seeking, state institutions were used to accumulate wealth and to serve and protect the interests of only certain individuals and ethnic and regional entities while ignoring the vast majority of the population (Ndikumana, 1998).

The OECD notes that in the best case the fragile state is weakly institutionalized and its power rarely extended beyond the main urban centres; and consequently more often than not, justice and security are delivered by a number of actors – only some of which are state actors (OECD, 2007c). Hence, in most fragile states in sub-Saharan Africa the challenge is to facilitate the birth or creation of a new sustainable state at all levels – to establish governance systems at the local, sub-national and national level that may have never existed or functioned before.\(^\text{30}\)

Clearly, a state-centric approach to peacebuilding, that focuses on the centre at the expense of the periphery (whether local levels such as communities or districts, or sub-national levels such as provinces), and on state actors at the expense of non-state actors might not only be inappropriate in the local context, it is an approach that might risk repeating history.

\(^\text{30}\) Where the state has been “captured” or privatized by the ruling elite, and has had no autonomy from that elite, it has seldom seriously considered the interests of the majority of its citizens, or considered governance issues at the local and sub-national level. In the context of widespread abject poverty, in a winner-take all struggle over the state – once in power, and with everything to lose, it is not surprising that elite rule has been authoritarian and violent. Coercion not consensus has been the norm, and politics has been essentially a material struggle (Fatton, 1988; Douma, 2006). See Ndikumana (2005) for figures related to the concentration of economic and political power in Burundi.
2.2 Policy guidelines for civilian disarmament programming

Security-related policy guidelines issued by the OECD DAC, developed through consensus among the member donors, provide the framework for civilian disarmament programming. The key points are summarized in this section.

Assessments and diagnostics. In order to take the local context as the starting point, and avoid doing harm (for example, by inadvertently fostering social divisions, corruption or abuse through a cash-for-weapons program lacking a good fit for the local context), a variety of diagnostic tools ought to be employed in the design of a disarmament initiative. Using numerous assessment tools produces a rich mix of qualitative and quantitative data leading to a good understanding of the local context and at the same time providing solid baseline information with which to measure subsequent progress (OECD, 2009). Assessment tools can include public

31 Baseline data includes the types of violence (e.g. political, criminal); its social, economic and psychological costs; the amount and type of weapons and ammunition in circulation; categories of weapons owners, and users; the new sources of guns and supply routes; an assessment of attitudes and perceptions of security, policing, justice systems and guns, including motivations and means to acquire
Taking Risks With Peace in Burundi

health tools that track geographic and demographic patterns of armed violence, as well as conflict, governance, institutional, justice, and security needs assessment tools that have been developed in recent years (OECD, 2007c). According to the OECD DAC, assessment and diagnostic exercises should be participatory in nature, prioritizing field-level activities that capture people’s understanding and perceptions of their security needs, and identifying all agents to whom they turn to for the provision of security as they go about their daily lives (OECD, 2009). Ideally, assessments and diagnostics are not one-off exercises prior to the intervention but are ongoing, given that the multitude of factors affecting civilian disarmament can change quickly and significantly in fragile contexts.

**Civilian demand for small arms and light weapons.** Previous policy work on civilian arms acquisition and disarmament in developing and fragile contexts has focused on the supply side – in the development of multilateral and regional arms control measures, for example, and efforts towards adherence – however more recent initiatives have focused on the demand side of the equation (Krause, 2007). There are structural, institutional, historical and socio-cultural factors that fuel the demand for small arms. Demand varies significantly between rich and poor, urban and rural, men and women, boys and girls, and other socio-economic and geographic factors (OECD, 2009). Owing to this multiple variance, disarming civilians is a complex process not susceptible to simple or quick policy solutions.

Recent work on small arms demand by the Small Arms Survey and the Quaker United Nations Office has focused on the concepts of motivations and means. *Motivations* refers to the factors influencing individual and group preferences for weapons while *means* includes both the monetary and non-monetary resources required to obtain them and the real and relative prices that must be paid for them (Atwood, Glatz and Muggah, 2006). Preferences can be further subdivided into *deep preferences* and *derived preferences* with deep ones being unchangeable. Personal and family safety is a deep preference. Derived preferences can change – for example how to go about defending the family’s security: by buying a pistol in the informal market, or by relying on the police. Preferences, resources and prices are interdependent and it is important to evaluate them jointly to appreciate how demand is manifest (Atwood, Glatz and Muggah, 2006). Using Rio de Janeiro as a case study, the authors highlight how the motivations and

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guns; vectors of peace (such as values, civil society groups, models of leadership, music and sports); and policies related to weapons possession (Buchanan and Widmer, 2006).
means of acquiring small arms of middle and higher income classes are radically different from the motivations and means of unemployed young men living in the favelas (slums). They conclude that civilian disarmament interventions need to focus less on weapons collection and destruction, and more on influencing the preferences, prices and resources available for acquiring weapons, with policy responses that lead to derived preferences other than acquiring weapons.

**Multi-sectoral and multi-level programming.** Since civilian disarmament is a complex process with multiple factors influencing it, the OECD calls for a multi-sectoral and multi-level programming approach (OECD, 2009). Multi-sectoral programming focusing on civilian disarmament might have elements of public health, conflict resolution and peace promotion, crime prevention, legal reform, and diplomacy at the regional level, to name some possibilities. Multi-level programming of the above elements should be highly context specific (OECD, 2007c). In order to support state building, multi-level programming in general should enable the role of the state at various levels of governance to be developed and strengthened over time, increasing state capacity to formulate policy and regulatory frameworks. In recognition of the fact that various agents might be providing security, a multi-level approach that targets civilian disarmament should aim to develop the relationship between security service providers and the beneficiaries of those services, enhancing delivery to make it more effective, accessible, accountable and rights-based (OECD, 2007c).

**Linking projects to an overall program strategy embedded in national development frameworks.** Security-related initiatives such as civilian disarmament are not only complex, they are also expected to be lengthy responses. To avoid isolated piecemeal activities, the OECD emphasizes the need for external support, whether project, sectoral, or budgetary, to be linked to an overall program strategy (OECD, 2005a). The strategy, itself, has to be integrated into national development frameworks, in keeping with the Paris Principles, to ensure that they remain a priority in national as well as donor planning and budgeting (OECD, 2007c).

**Whole-of-government programming.** Recognizing that political, security and development objectives are linked in fragile contexts, and that multi-sectoral approaches are necessary, the OECD has advanced the concept of a whole-of-government approach to peacebuilding and security-related initiatives. In a whole-of-government approach (WoG), development, political, military/police and diplomatic efforts at different levels are combined (OECD, 2004; OECD,
2007a). By adopting a whole-of-government approach, external actors minimize possible contradictions between development, defence and diplomacy-related policies, and the inadvertent exacerbation of security problems. Ideally, there is a comprehensive and shared vision of core development and security challenges among all departments, in part achieved through joint assessments and analysis between donors and between donors and partner countries (OECD, 2007a).

**Synchronized programming.** The OECD notes that in recent years, WoG efforts have improved significantly, via new mechanisms such as pooled funding, joint assessments and inter-sector task forces. Nevertheless, achieving genuinely comprehensive approaches remains challenging. As a result, the OECD now considers that a synchronized approach may be more practical than a combined or coordinated approach at the operational level (OECD, 2009). In a synchronized approach, partners act autonomously within their own mandates, but there is a common understanding of the issue as well as the long-term objectives.

**Direct and indirect civilian disarmament programming.** Armed violence reduction initiatives in general and civilian disarmament in particular can either be an indirect part of a security or development-related program or be the direct and explicit program goal. In indirect programming, the main “target” will be other security or development objectives, but the program will incorporate some civilian disarmament priorities in its objectives (OECD, 2007c).

**Weapons for Development.** One type of community-based programming, weapons for development, has gained prominence in recent years. Weapons for Development programs (WfD) have shown that they can have an educational impact, shifting perceptions of security, and opening up public spaces for the circulation of people, in addition to removing weapons from communities (OECD, 2009). Nonetheless others note that the notion of community needs to be thoroughly analyzed in the particular context because too often a community is considered to be a homogenous and positive entity that may be corrupted by external influences, rather than a heterogeneous entity with numerous competing interests (Buchanan and Widmer, 2006). Central to WfD initiatives is the question of incentives for handing over weapons. At the very least, incentives have to be perceived as relevant by the majority of stakeholders (OECD, 2009). Incentives may need to vary according to geographic, demographic and even seasonal factors (Buchanan and Widmer, 2006).
**Financial and managerial sustainability of initiatives.** The financial and managerial sustainability of any security-related initiative must be a priority, given that these tend to be intensive, complex and long-term programs, as stated above. The OECD is quite specific about financial sustainability of any service delivery program including security: detailed estimates of the costs the recovering state will have to assume must be correlated to the projected state revenues over a set period of time (OECD, 2007c). With regards to managerial sustainability, without management development programs, stand-alone “train and equip” projects with an emphasis on outputs have repeatedly been shown to be ineffective and cost inefficient. Managerial development programs have to include human capital improvement programs in which the skills required to use new managerial processes are acquired (OECD, 2007c).

### 2.3 Key Issues: Gender and age

In post-conflict societies the proliferation and misuse of SALW impacts men and women, young and old, differently. According to Danish Church Aid (DCA), the vast majority of both perpetrators and victims of armed violence around the globe are young men, while women are more vulnerable to its indirect socio-economic consequences (DCA, 2006). Though women are far less likely to be killed through gun violence than men, they are left severely traumatized, intimidated and often sexually violated when they become victims (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2004).

**The local dimension.** Women and youth are more likely to have important social roles at the community and local level, and gender and age-sensitive disarmament programming should be aware of gender and age dynamics at that level (Atwood, Glatz and Muggah, 2006). As Conway notes, women are usually intimately aware of the security and SALW situation in their communities, as well as the needs and concerns of community groups, and are usually willing to participate in initiatives seeking to improve security and stability. Women may advocate for civilian disarmament. Women are likely to know the numbers and types of weapons in a community and popular attitudes towards them. Women are likely to be very aware of the needs in a community, and eventually can help determine which type of disarmament and weapons collection programs would be most appropriate, who it should target, when it should take place and how related information should be disseminated (Conway, 2007). It is important to determine whether women and youth have been involved in civilian disarmament initiatives in Burundi, and to what degree.
Different folks, different definitions. Definitions of “security” and “stability” themselves are highly gendered as well as culturally and historically specific, reflecting how men and women, boys and girls, have different positions in their communities and how they experience armed conflict and its aftermath in different ways. In a study carried out in West Africa, for example, whereas men emphasize personal, economic, and community security, women stress food security, family safety, freedom of movement within and outside their communities, health, and educational security (Potter, 2008).

Gender and age-disaggregated research. There’s a need for a more systematic approach to documenting gender-disaggregated qualitative and quantitative data related to SALW (e.g. homicides, injuries, location of outbreaks of violence, etc.) (Johnson et al., 2005). Gender and age sensitive research can lead to understanding how different groups in society define security-related priorities, how the economic activities of different groups are impacted by armed violence, how these groups view SALW control mechanisms, how they view and define post-war “stability”, and so on (Johnston et al., 2005; Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2004).

Ideologies of masculinity. Youth, like women, tend to be seen as a homogeneous group with limited capacity for affecting change, rather than as a source of social capital (Potter, 2008). In the post-conflict context, youth can be a tremendous source of energy and positive change. Nevertheless it is important to examine whether amongst young people there is an ideology that associates masculinity with armed violence and guns. Countering socially constructed association between violence, power and masculinity is of key importance where such ideologies exist (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2004). Youth and masculinity are after all socially and culturally defined constructs: definitions of adolescence, childhood and adulthood are rooted in local contexts, functioning largely independently of actual age (Potter, 2008).

In many African contexts, leaders of armed factions have deliberately exploited the sense of powerlessness that many young men, lacking status and chronically unemployed, feel. Post-conflict reconstruction must pay specific attention to youth, including and support their peaceful integration into communities, avoiding stigmatization and marginalization, focusing on livelihoods, education and political empowerment (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2006).
**Protective factors.** Research has shown that most young men, even in the most violent contexts, shun armed violence. In each specific context, it is important to determine what are the protective factors against the use of small arms, and support and strengthen them. According to research carried out by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, protective factors may include stable relationships with people who would be disappointed by violent behaviour; access to alternative livelihoods and identities for self-worth (e.g. being a good student); finding an alternative peer group that does not support violence (e.g. membership in sports teams); reduced personal exposure to violence; and having views about what it means to be a man that do not involve violence (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2005). While the research will not examine ideologies of masculinity or protective factors per sé, it will be important to note whether initiatives have taken into account these gender and age considerations in their design and implementation.

### 2.4 Key Issues: SSR and DDR

The security sector is a special public good, because without a minimal level of public order, security from violence, and justice, the delivery of other public goods is not possible or is extremely difficult. In that sense, the delivery of security and justice is the most basic of core functions of the state, and SSR must be a top priority for recovery (OECD, 2007a).

**Sequencing.** In the first chapter it was noted that civilian disarmament, SSR and DDR are highly complementary and mutually reinforcing activities. Where SSR and DDR are perceived to have had less success than expected, people are unlikely to turn over weapons in civilian disarmament initiatives if they feel their physical security and safety is threatened. The timing of projects to reduce the number of small arms in civilian hands therefore has to be closely linked to how well SSR and DDR initiatives are progressing. In particular, visible progress on police reform is often vital to increase the public perceptions of security as a precursor to civilian disarmament. Too often, according to the OECD, these programs are carried out in isolation from each other (OECD, 2005a). Sequencing and the links between civilian disarmament, SSR and DDR is key in Burundi, where all three activities are being carried out.

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32 A public good is non-excludable and non-rival in consumption, such as a traffic light or clean air. Public goods are the opposite of private goods, such as a car (ownership is excludable) or a piece of cake (rival in consumption, since others cannot enjoy it once it has been consumed). See Le Monde diplomatique, “What is a public good?” June 2000. At http://mondediplomato/2000/06/15publicgood.
Perceptions and felt needs. Perceptions and felt needs of the local population related to security are of key importance. It is therefore surprising that according to the OECD, donor-sponsored security system reform programs have too often been conducted without reference to local perceptions, or even contrary to the priorities, perceptions and needs of local populations in fragile contexts – who desire above all concrete improvements of security in the sense of safety from physical and armed attacks (OECD, 2009).

Consequently, OECD DAC donors have agreed that security system reform should be people-centred, locally owned with a high level of participation by domestic stakeholders, and based on democratic norms, human rights principles and the rule of law (OECD, 2004). Reform therefore needs to be based on participatory assessments, designs, and evaluations, and it has to take into account the multiple providers – state as well as non-state – that provide security where people live, where they work, purchase goods, where they commute and travel (OECD, 2009). Local participation in civilian disarmament and security-related initiatives are examined in this research project.

Meeting short-term needs while building for long-term reform. In fragile, recovering contexts, the challenge for SSR actors is to support initiatives that meet immediate and short-term local security and justice needs while putting in place some of the building blocks for long-term change that can then be built upon (OECD, 2007a). For the OECD, the best long-term response includes the restoration of effective mechanisms to maintain public security and an appropriate regulation framework for small arms, an increased capacity to monitor, and prevent illegal arms transfers, and the collection and destruction of all surplus weapons (OECD, 2005a).

Local ownership and a long-term vision means moving towards long-term SSR programs (which may include short-term projects) in which the involvement of domestic stakeholders is more important than any visible output. Donors “facilitate” rather than “do” SSR through supporting locally-driven processes and building national capacities (Bryden, 2007).
SSR and DDR have to be carried out in close alignment, to prevent the creation of a “security vacuum”, which obviously would have a negative impact on civilian disarmament programs (OECD, 2007a). Poorly carried out DDR has serious consequences for civilian disarmament. The presence of armed ex-combatants may lead to more weapons acquisition by civilians, so that armed self-defence becomes even more accepted in society. In addition, the surfeit of weapons from former combatants, some of them looted or poorly managed, often results in their being recycled into civilian hands (Small Arms Survey, 2005).

**Incentives for demobilization.** As previously noted, incentives for disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating have to be considered as relevant by at least a majority of stakeholders. It is key to avoid DDR programs from turning into “reward” programs, or fueling an illegal transnational weapons market (Small Arms Survey, 2005). The impact that incentives offered for demobilization will have on the ability of security institutions to reform also has to be carefully considered. According to the OECD, the kind of measures that are needed for a community to be willing to accept ex-combatants back into society and for ex-combatants to lay down their weapons and demobilize will have huge impacts on the SSR process itself (OECD, 2007a).
**Reintegration.** For the OECD, it is the reintegration phase of a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program that is most challenging. Reintegration must be looked at not only from the perspective of the men, women and children being demobilized, but also of the communities which must reabsorb them. Both the communities and the demobilized individuals may have changed radically as a result of conflict and traditional roles may no longer be available, acceptable, or possible (Potter, 2008). A key lesson is that DDR should also be approached from a state-building perspective, requiring community-based and national development approaches, for example via its inclusion in poverty reduction strategy papers (OECD, 2009; Small Arms Survey 2005).

**Summary.** In this chapter, the current consensus on what constitutes good policy in civilian disarmament has been discussed. In addition to the overarching principles on aid effectiveness and good international engagement in fragile states, there are a number of specific guidelines for civilian disarmament compiled from the various publications of the OECD DAC as well as other organizations. In the next chapter, important lessons from four previous civilian disarmament campaigns will be presented. Key points of civilian disarmament good policy and good practice are again included in point form in Appendix A. The purpose is to have a convenient summary to refer to when discussing the initiatives in Burundi.
CHAPTER 3
LESSONS LEARNED: PREVIOUS CIVILIAN DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES

In this chapter, four past civilian disarmament initiatives are reviewed, one each from South East Asia – Cambodia; one from South East Europe – Albania; one from West Africa – Sierra Leone; and one from Central America – El Salvador. In addition to obvious historical and cultural differences, there are other factors that make these four a good sample for a review of good practice. To name just a couple of factors for each case, for example, the impact that a well-organized initiative and a committed population can have, as in Cambodia; the limitations of civilian disarmament where there are regional tensions and a gun-owning culture, as in the case of Albania; the political failure of pro-disarmament legislation even though armed violence is a serious societal problem, as in El Salvador; and the negative consequences of not having a gender approach in a disarmament initiative, as in the case of Sierra Leone.

Policy and practice are of course linked, and many of the lessons learned from field experiences have been picked up in the policy-making process at the OECD DAC. Yet there is great benefit in reviewing these experiences, to understand how design and implementation decisions impacted on the eventual outcomes of each project, in very different circumstances. Indeed the evaluations included here were carried out prior to the more recent OECD focus on security system reform and its links with civilian disarmament and armed violence reduction. Still, initiatives either had SSR-related elements in their programming, or emphasized the need to continue the disarmament initiatives with SSR activities.

The reviews for each initiative are based on one or two key documents, in most cases evaluations carried out at the end of the initiative. In no way are the reviews meant to be broad in scope. The objective is to pull out as many practical lessons that are relevant to the context in Burundi. Key issues and findings are selected from each case study, and often cross-referenced with those from the other case studies.

3.1 Albania
Following a devastating financial crisis, in 1997 Albania experienced the sensational and dramatic collapse of the state including its security services. As the security situation deteriorated, widespread civilian looting of state as well as industry small arms and light weapons (SALW) stockpiles took place. Within a few months, 500-600 thousand military-type
SALW were seized and dispersed throughout the country of just over 3 million people. In 1998, a new government requested assistance from the UN to help recover the weapons.

This summary is based on a 2005 study on the impacts of the UN-led civilian disarmament program published by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva. For the study the researchers used a participatory monitoring and evaluation methodology that included “Before and Now Situational Analysis” and “Determining Decision-Making Processes” techniques, its conclusions capturing the perspective of local people directly involved in and affected by the disarmament program, their roles and perceptions of the issues.33

**Sensitization and awareness-raising campaigns.** There were awareness-raising campaigns on radio and television, on new legislation banning the private ownership of SALW, on the dangers of having weapons at home, and on the Weapons for Development projects. According to local stakeholders, particularly in rural areas, the campaigns had a significant impact. The timing was also good: as armed violence shot up after the dispersion of so many weapons, Albanians had become wary of the increase in homicides and armed crime. Awareness-raising campaigns also proved to be important in Cambodia, El Salvador and Sierra Leone.

In Albania, the government with the support of UNDP offered communities a number of development projects as incentives for turning in their weapons. The Weapons for Development (WfD) projects included repair to health centres, water supply systems, street lighting, river embankment works, road and bridge construction, and public telephones. The projects were implemented by local organizations with UNDP support. The Albanian program was the first time that the term “weapons for development” had been used, though the approach had been already used in places like Nicaragua and Mali.

**Project design cannot overlook root causes of armed violence.** In hindsight, local stakeholders agreed that project designers first had to focus on researching the root causes that drove people to arm themselves and engage in armed violence. A critical understanding of the past as well as the present is a prerequisite, and it should be participatory, so community members can reflect on what went wrong and how they envisage resolving the problem.

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Appropriate activities that address the root causes of armed violence could then be designed and built-in to the WfD initiative.

The root causes identified by local stakeholders included ethnic tensions in neighbouring Kosovo; economic marginalization once the armament factories closed (which were a significant part of the small nation’s economy); the general collapse of the economy, sharply driving up poverty rates; a gun tradition; and home protection.\textsuperscript{34} But in fact even locals were at a loss to explain why so many people had decided to loot the weapons depots. Pointing to the need for further research, many respondents simply said that “people were doing it, so others started looting as well. It was what people did at that time.”

**Weapons collection drives.** There were various methodologies used, including door-to-door drives, police appeals via mass media, and in addition to collection centres, special booths were constructed in strategic places for those who wanted to discreetly get rid of weapons. People could turn in weapons without any legal reprisal. It is to be expected in weapon collections in volatile contexts that the first weapons to be turned in will be old guns, and weapons considered too dangerous to store or too difficult to sell. In Albania people first got rid of light weapons such as anti-tank weapons, machine guns, mines and grenades; bigger guns were handed in first because they were not easy to store in individual homes nor easy to sell. Later, under the WfD projects, people tended to turn in assault rifles, AK-47s and AK-56s.

**Incentives that make sense.** Stakeholders agreed that a bottom-up approach to determine the types of incentives to be offered is necessary. In hindsight, many noted that communities would choose projects that would immediately meet physical security needs. A great majority felt that the best incentive to curb the spread of illicit SALW remained the strict enforcement of laws and regulations, in tandem with durable solutions addressing factors driving the demand for weapons.

\textsuperscript{34} Some of these are clearly symptomatic and not what peacebuilding organizations consider as root causes of armed violence and conflict. See DFID (2002) Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes.
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Local women participating in the evaluation had an interesting observation to make regarding incentives used in this project. Many responded that since the incentives used had little relation to the root causes leading people to arm themselves, and to armed violence, they had had a minimal impact on the success or lack of success of WfD projects. Rather, successes were based on people’s willingness to surrender their weapons. It seems that fatigue and a desire to be done with the problem was a bigger motivation than the incentives offered.

*Individual surrender of weapons for community benefit.* An important issue arose in Albania: the fact that while WfD incentives were designed to reward the entire community, rather than individuals, decisions to hand in weapons were often made individually. It was, therefore, necessary to consider what could be done to convince the individual to turn in the weapon. In Albania, the roles of elders and women were key. Various respondents noted that elders had set an important precedent by being among the first to turn over weapons. Women also exerted considerable pressure at home, emphasizing the risks of weapons and the vulnerability of children.

*Lack of gender awareness in the program and lack of participation by women and youth.* The Albania program shows that unless a gender-sensitive approach is used, women will tend to be absent from program design or implementation. Though Albanian women had a significant role in convincing weapon holders – mostly men and male youth – to turn in their weapons, they were hardly encouraged to participate in designing or implementing weapon collections programs. Likewise, and in spite of the fact that male youth were active in acquiring weapons and in disarmament efforts, their special needs were not taken into account in program design.

* Differences among urban, rural and border populations.* It is important to note that there were significant differences in perceptions surrounding SALW and disarmament, and choices (of incentives) according to whether the locals were urban-based, rural-based, or lived in communities along the border with the republics of the former Yugoslavia including Macedonia and Kosovo. People in border communities were much less likely to disarm. In terms of potential WfD projects for the communities, rural-based men preferred water supply projects, while urban-based men preferred health centres, roads, street lighting, and public telephones.

The disarmament program in Albania was not entirely successful – as of 2005 it was estimated that only one third of the 600,000 weapons looted in 1997 had been retrieved (some 200,000),
with another third having been transferred to Albanian factions during the Kosovo and Macedonia crises of 1999 and 2001. The remaining 200,000 SALW were still unaccounted for, as well as an estimated one thousand tons of explosives.

**WfD leading to security system reform.** Given the fact that weapon possession had deep cultural roots in Albania, it was realized that all illegally held arms would never be retrieved. The instability of the region may have also influenced people to keep their weapons. According to UNDP, in 2005 this led to a shift from weapons for development to security sector reform. This was complemented by a pragmatic approach to arms control including weapons amnesties where owners of illegal weapons could take their arms for registration without penal consequences. Local stakeholders in addition believed that the shift to SSR had occurred because it was also much more difficult to secure funding for WfD than for SSR.

As far as the new SSR activities that had just begun, at the time of this evaluation local stakeholders were generally critical of what they had seen. They did not feel that SSR programs addressed the real security threats to people. It was mostly described as providing logistics support to the police and other security organizations, with little emphasis on reforming the command and control structures so they could better meet the security needs of the community.

**Cultural and situational barriers to civilian disarmament initiatives.** The WfD project in Albania shows the very real limits that disarmament can face. In Albanian culture, there is a long tradition whereby every family keeps a gun for prestige and to protect the home. Stakeholders agreed that many civilians would always keep a weapon regardless of incentives to give them up. In addition, while many of those Albanians who looted weapons returned them, those who had bought their weapons did not, since they wanted personal reimbursement instead of compensation going to the whole community.

National efforts cannot be taken in isolation from regional action. Stakeholders agreed that while neighbouring Kosovo remained in a state of political limbo, Albanians in border communities would keep their weapons because of fear that war would break out again. Another reason for retaining weapons was that a lucrative market for them could again develop over the border on account of fighting.
3.2 Cambodia

In April 2000, the European Union Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons Program (EU-ASAC) opened its office in Phnom Penh. EU-ASAC was following up on civilian disarmament campaigns carried out by the Cambodian government in the previous year (1999), after the issue of Sub-Decree 38 that declared private ownership of weapons illegal in the country. The government’s disarmament campaign used both persuasive and coercive methods, sometimes hard-handed tactics, and claimed a degree of success in the cities and towns, but not in remote and rural areas, where, reportedly for protection, locals tended to hide their weapons in the forests.

The observations made here are based on a 2002 descriptive publication on EU-ASAC by the Development Cooperation and Small Arms Control (Decosac) Division of GTZ, the German development cooperation agency, and an external evaluation of the concluded program, carried out in July 2006 by the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC).

**Significant impact.** One can only be impressed by Cambodia’s successful experience with civilian disarmament. At the time of the Paris Peace Agreement of October 1991, there were between 319,000 and 462,000 small arms in circulation in the country, with the upper estimate more likely. After the seven-year program (2000-2006), over 82% of the weapons had been brought under government control or destroyed. There was an estimated drop nation-wide in armed violence of 70% between 1998-2003, and this figure is supported by hospital records and by research carried out by the Small Arms Survey.

**Box 3.1 Five Components of EU-ASAC**

1. Assist in drafting a new Arms Law
2. Assist in developing a weapons registration and safe and secure storage system
3. Implement Weapons and Development projects
4. Assist in destroying weapons
5. Support public awareness campaigns

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36 SEESAC (2006). Evaluation of the EU SALW Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia, 2nd Edition. South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Belgrade. According to the evaluation document, SEESAC was selected on the basis of being a regional SALW initiative that had developed a range of operational support tools and was one of few European operational institutions with the range of technical skills necessary for the evaluation.
Compared to 1998 figures, by 2003 the overall homicide rate dropped 55%, a significant impact given that in 1998 60% of homicides were committed with small arms, but by 2003 this ratio had dropped to 40%. The lethality of violence has certainly been reduced in Cambodia. For the 158,000 legal small arms in the country, the development of appropriate safe and secure weapons storage infrastructure and systems in the country means that the risk of proliferation of SALW has been significantly reduced.

According to the evaluators, a 2005 research report by a national NGO showed much greater feelings of security prevailed across the country. A series of indicators were used in the research to assess perceptions of personal security, including feeling confident traveling to remote farmland, not fearing gun-related violence, or in the past three years (2002-2005) having heard or seen a weapon that did not belong to the security forces.

**Strong public awareness of the problems stemming from SALW.** The public awareness campaigns on the dangers of keeping weapons were considered to be highly successful, as in the case of Albania. National NGOs were engaged to train local village and community leaders on the dangers of SALW, and these trainings were linked to more general public awareness campaigns. There was also a mass media campaign. Surveys indicated that a major motivation for people to hand in their weapons was also the fear of punishment by the authorities for illegal possession. Additionally, it was common for villagers to inform about others possessing weapons, which suggests there was a genuine popular desire to disarm. This moment in time where a large number of civilians in a society decide that somehow armed violence is finished and it is time to disarm is something that will come up again in the case of Sierra Leone. Doubtlessly a major ingredient in the success of EU-ASAC, it is something that according to the evaluators needed to be better understood.

**Strengthening civil society organizations.** Cooperation with civil society and the development of NGO capacity was part of the EU-ASAC mandate. The program engaged with civil society in three major ways: consultation on the development of SLAW policy and legislation; partnerships for implementing Weapons for Development initiatives; and cooperation with NGOs in SALW awareness activities. In fact, during the initial stages of the program, the Working Group for Weapons Reduction was a loose network of NGOs whose work was relevant to the SALW program, but with the support of the program evolved into an NGO itself, focusing exclusively on SALW and armed violence reduction issues.
Weapons registration and a safe, secure storage system is a confidence-building opportunity. The program included a pilot project whose objective was to improve the registration and safe storage of weapons belonging to the armed forces, in four locations. The pilot project included training for high-ranking officers in computerization and registration practices. The provision of high-quality storage facilities and a centralized registration database, as well as training, gained the interest of the Ministry of Defence, which considered extending the system into a national integrated registration system. According to the authors, the police forces were also studying possible improvements to their storage warehouses in provincial capitals. The presence or absence of weapons registration and storage systems was not mentioned in the Albania review; however in El Salvador, for the first time a study on armed violence used primary sources such as police incident registries, and the project also entailed a large-scale systematization of law enforcement databases in the country.

Weapons for Development. In exchange for weapons, community development councils in each Cambodian province were promised development projects, mostly water wells and schools. No personal rewards were given. In order to cover the national territory, EU-ASAC began seven smaller Weapons for Development projects in various provinces, carried out by local NGOs. The NGOs were trained in project administration and reporting procedures, ensuring proper reporting for the program as well as supporting local capacity.

Participatory program development and flexible management. Program development was a participatory process that involved substantial consultation with local and government counterparts and partners. The European Union appointed a Special Advisor to EU-ASAC, who acted as program manager as well. This program manager was provided with the appropriate flexibility to respond to the political, security and operational dynamics on the ground. According to the evaluators, this flexibility was essential in the program’s success.

The luxury of counting on specialists for the program. EU-ASAC also had the luxury of having experienced specialists responsible for each component of the program. Relying on experts to develop plans for each element that were achievable, measurable, and verifiable – rather than generalists – was considered of key importance for the success of the program as well.
**Longer funding cycles needed.** EU-ASAC was initially funded on a year-to-year basis but this was found to be an operational handicap, and the evaluators suggested that multi-year funding would permit the funds to be more efficiently and effectively committed over a number of years. Program activities were implemented each year “as if” they were part of a longer-term plan, but there was no guarantee that this was the case, and moreover a lot of time was spent each year making the case and arguments for extending the project for another 12 months. Fixed long-term planning with the Government of Cambodia on a three or five-year plan was not possible. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the Dutch government has committed to an 8-year security sector development project in Burundi – the type of long-term commitment that the OECD DAC has called for security-related initiatives.

**A national commission that works and a national SALW control strategy in place.** The evaluators were straightforward in their assessment of the National Commission for the Reform and Management of Weapons and Explosives in Cambodia (NCWMR). It was too high-level and therefore rarely met. It did not have any civil society representation, and was ineffective, having failed (by mid-2006) to develop an integrated national SALW control strategy. The authors called for authority to be devolved to a more practical level to improve effectiveness and efficiency of the commission. The lack of a working national commission and a national SALW control strategy were considered as among the most serious setbacks in the program.

**Links to SSR activities.** The program provided equipment including motorcycles, mountain bicycles, two-way radios and surveillance cameras to the national police, who also received training in community relations and human rights. Though there was no explicit objective or programmatic link to SSR-type activities to begin with, the program staff early on came to the conclusion that one of the barriers to community policing – which could persuade villagers to get rid of weapons – was the poverty levels of police families, leaving officers open to corruption. Corruption of security actors due to low wages and persistent poverty is a factor also mentioned in the case of Sierra Leone and Albania and something also found in Burundi.

The innovative solution the EU-ASAC program chose in order to combat police corruption was to provide agricultural support to the wives of policemen, through the Village Model Gardens and the Village Model Poultry Farms. The women were provided with not only the capability to develop their own small-scale enterprises but also the skills and resources necessary to train other families to develop their own enterprises. Police wives found themselves with a greater
mediation role in the communities between villagers and their police husbands, in addition to dispensing advice on vegetables and poultry. In terms of income, they had a 50% increase, and consuming their own vegetables saved additional funds. The importance of gender-sensitive approaches and women’s participation in design and implementation was also a factor in Albania and will come up in the case of Sierra Leone further on. In the case of Cambodia, research revealed that traditional institutions were often biased against women, and resources for raising the capacity of women to participate were needed.

The evaluators also noted that something not achieved during the lifetime of the EU-ASAC, was the development of a professional Code of Conduct of the Police. This, they noted, also proved a major opportunity and entry point for wider SSR. Many of the future measures suggested by the evaluators as necessary for SALW control were SSR related, such as the code, as well as the development of democratic oversight mechanisms of security forces, and improving police capacity to tackle the criminal use of weapons.

**The risk of crime as a spoiler to arms control efforts.** The evaluators noted that in almost all areas of the country there was a persistent and serious problem with gang and criminal violence. Though it seemed that Cambodian criminals were now mostly armed with knives rather than firearms, there were various respondents, particularly businessmen, who expressed the need for once more obtaining guns to defend against robbers. The small-scale smuggling that inevitably exists for criminal purposes (which can only be dealt with by intelligence-led police operations), could potentially increase in scale to re-supply weapons for a citizenry concerned with gangs and crime.

3.3 El Salvador

El Salvador’s 12-year civil war (1980-1992) left the country a huge SALW legacy. As of 2005 it was estimated that there were up to 500,000 legal and illegal small arms in circulation, this in a country of 6.7 million in a territory of only 21,000 square kilometres. Armed crime occurs in all regions of the country, which is considered a “critical crime-threat country” by the US.  

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There is a cultural aspect to gun possession in the country. Much like in its northern neighbours Mexico and the US, small arms possession is considered a prudent choice given armed crime levels, and a fundamental right of law-abiding citizens, who can carry their weapons in public. Criminal gangs are a major problem in El Salvador, particularly youth gangs collectively referred to as “las maras,” notorious for shocking levels of violence, and the use of small arms. Not surprisingly, according to a strategic review of the project (see below), El Salvador at the time (mid-2005) had one of the world’s highest homicide rates, and 80% of homicides were committed with small arms. In 2000, the UNDP country team, in cooperation with a number of governmental and non-governmental partners, initiated the Strengthening Mechanisms for Small Arms Control Project (SMSAC)\(^{39}\) part of the broader Society Without Violence (SWV) Program. The summary included in this section is based on a strategic review of the SMSAC Project, carried out for the UNDP by the Small Arms Survey in August 2005 and published in February 2006.\(^{40}\) The three basic activities of the SMSAC Project are listed in Box 3.2.

**Box 3.2**

*Three separate but mutually reinforcing activities of the El Salvador project*

1. A baseline assessment on SALW in the country.
2. A campaign promoting a ban on carrying weapons in public.
3. Public awareness and political advocacy activities on the small arms threat to public safety.

**Disarmament while small arms continued to be imported.** There were precedents to the SMSAC Project in El Salvador. In addition to some 10,000 SALW handed in during the peace process (a relatively minor amount), from 1996-1999 a private sector coalition had carried out a “Goods for Guns” project in the country. Results of the project were mixed. On the one hand, the project showed that private sector, civil society and government institutions were able to cooperate in civilian disarmament initiatives. On the other, it was difficult to make an impact on the total number of small arms in El Salvador – an estimated 9,500 weapons were removed from circulation as a result of the initiative, but during the same period, 48,620 small arms had been legally imported into the country.

\(^{39}\) SMSAC is a personal acronym chosen for expediency, and it is not an official one.

According to the author, the SMSAC Project is illustrative of what a pro-disarmament coalition can achieve in challenging circumstances while contributing building blocks for a longer term arms control strategy for the country. Though it was decided at the time that a civilian disarmament initiative was not possible in the short-term, according to the authors of the review, SMSAC achieved sustainability by going on with a number of additional activities, in addition to making small arms issues come to the fore in all sectors of society.

**Successful creation of a broad pro-disarmament coalition.** SMSAC was successful in securing the participation of various prominent actors from across Salvadoran society. The SWV Program Steering Committee was composed of well-known professionals and other notables. There was a Technical Working Group staffed by experts in the fields of law, epidemiology and sociology. The overall SWV program also had the inclusion of a high-level governmental agency, the National Public Security Council, as a partner. SMSAC took advantage of its high-level academic partners and private sector partners. According to the review, civil society organizations including academia gave the project an “organic, participatory character, while government partners ensured official cooperation and political legitimacy, and private sector partners lent the influence of the business community.” Though Cambodia’s national commission NCWMR did not function properly as discussed in the previous section, El Salvador’s SWV Program Steering Committee and Technical Working Group are good examples of how a coalition can work, with well-known notables, experts, government, and civil society and private sector members coming together with a common goal. Unfortunately, this sort of coalition is not present in Burundi, and as discussed later, this has implications for good policy on national ownership.

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41 Academic partners included the national program of the regional Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), the national Institute of Public Opinion of the Central American University (IUDOP), which had research and polling capabilities, and the National Foundation for the Study of Applied Law (FESPAD). All participated in the design and implementation of projects.
Detailed pre-design studies. The SMSAC Project carried out a multi-year study on SALW in the country. The final report, “The Firearms and Violence Study,” was published in 2003, receiving wide coverage in the national media (see Box 3.3 for research on root causes of armed violence in the country). One significant finding was the fact that someone who used a small arm for protection against violent attack was four times more likely to die in the attack than someone who did not defend him or herself at all. The finding was valuable in countering the traditional Salvadoran reliance on arms as a means of defence. A significant spin-off of the research was the creation of a crime database managed by the national police, trained to use it.

Unfortunately the study did not produce practical baseline indicators or other data meant to measure the project’s impact. There was no monitoring and evaluation mechanism from the outset either, as in the case of Cambodia.

Political defeat of legislative initiative to restrict small arms. The 2003 report identified the problem of permissive firearms legislation and the weakness of institutions responsible for enforcement. The Technical Working Group and FESPAD led an initiative for reform of the current Law for the Control and Regulation of Firearms, Ammunitions, Explosives and Similar Items; principal among the numerous proposed reforms was the proposal to eliminate the carrying of guns by private individuals in public places.

In February 2005 the package of reforms was presented to the Legislative Assembly, and in the following weeks a political debate ensued in Congress and in the press, particularly regarding the carrying of guns in public. In spite of popular support, the law reform package faced strong opposition from powerful congressmen and special interest groups, including a “shadowy” group.

Box 3.3
Factors contributing to violence in El Salvador

1. Weak public and private institutions that favour violent means to resolve conflicts
2. Violent cultural patterns, such as domestic abuse
3. Economic inequality
4. Social, cultural and economic ravages of civil war
5. External factors such as international organized crime
6. Proliferation of small arms, ammunition and explosives throughout the country

42 The head of the national police supported the ban, and according to opinion polls so did 83% of the Salvadoran public, while 55% disagreed with the notion that private citizens had the right to own a gun.
of businessmen from the 24 arms importers in El Salvador, and literally thousands of private security organizations operating in the country. Faced with such an adverse political climate, reformers were not surprised by the results: the reform to the law adopted by Congress in March 2005 did not include the carrying ban.\textsuperscript{43} With the March 2005 defeat of the legislative initiative, the political and legislative climate was not considered favourable for carrying out a national micro-disarmament plan under the responsibility of public officials. This was the only element of the SMSAC objectives that was not achieved.

**Children as protagonists in strategic awareness campaigns.** In order to counter deep-seated cultural factors contributing to the possession of small arms by civilians, a campaign on the danger of small arms was carried out in twelve municipalities throughout the country, chosen for their high levels of violence and small arms problems. There were direct engagements with children and youth as well as media campaigns using advertising and press. The central protagonists were children, which was a strategic decision made to bring together a wide range of institutions to cooperate in a context that was insulated from the overheated political agendas that tended to dominate the issue.

**Activities for youth and weapons-free zones.** Activities for 18-35 year olds, who according to research were the group that most used small arms, included municipal sports events involving hundreds of young people, and which were used to promote the campaign message of “With Firearms, Nobody Wins.” The newspaper, radio, television and public spaces advertising campaign ran for six months, primarily depicting children victimized by armed violence in El Salvador. Weapons-free zones in markets and other public spaces were designated in coordination with municipalities. The zones were not actually enforced, the objective being largely publicity-oriented. Programming for youth was not part of the other civilian disarmament initiatives, though the role of youth in weapons acquisition, use and surrender was a feature of all case studies. In Burundi, as it turns out, the awareness campaign was not nearly as long as 6 months, though that is what the UN and donors had recommended.

\textsuperscript{43} The reforms included measures considered minor without the ban, limiting to one every two years the number of arms an individual could purchase, whereas previously there had been no limit. The minimum age for a gun license was raised to 21 from 18 years and permission to carry a gun in public to 24 from 21 years.
Follow-up activities with municipalities, with academia, and the press. SMSAC laid the groundwork for a number of follow-up activities meant to keep up the momentum on SALW control in the country. One was the Weapons-Free Municipalities Project, a pilot project that seeks a reduction in armed violence through a municipal-level ban on carrying small arms in public spaces, to be enforced by national and municipal police. Two municipalities were chosen, one governed by the ruling party, the other by the opposition, to avoid politicization in such a charged atmosphere. A series of public conferences on armed violence was held. There was support for graduate academic programs related to violence prevention, as well as journalism outreach improving media coverage of armed violence.

According to the strategic review, while the legislative reform initiative failed to generate an immediate result, this does not imply there was overall ineffectiveness. A ban on carrying weapons might still be years away in El Salvador, but the campaign succeeded in maneuvering the issue into the national spotlight, building political support for reform, and accelerating progress towards such a ban.

3.4 Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone’s brutal civil war was on world television screens throughout the 1990s. Between the initial March 1991 invasion of the country by rebels of the Liberian-supported Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the end of the war in January 2002 with the full implementation of the May 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement, rebels fought government forces in numerous periods of surges and retreats. There were coups and crises on the government side, with civilian authorities losing political power more than once. All sides to the conflict committed atrocious human rights violations, with the machete amputations of civilian limbs and widespread rape being among the most notorious of abuses.\(^4^4\)

This review is based on a UNIDIR-UNDP joint report, which used the results of a countrywide survey of over a thousand persons on small arms and security in Sierra Leone, carried out

\(^{44}\) There was international attention on the conflict when a military junta was ousted in March 1998 by forces of the Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG); the May 2000 kidnapping by the RUF of some 500 UN peacekeepers from the just-established UN Mission UNAMISIL; and the subsequent deployment of British troops that took control of the capital in late May 2000, sending the message that the international community was not going to permit the taking of Freetown by rebel factions.
between March and June 2003.\textsuperscript{45} The survey was carried out more than a year after the long-drawn DDR process in Sierra Leone had ended in January 2002, and several months after the Arms for Development (AfD) Project had begun in November 2002. The survey’s goal was to better understand the small arms environment in the country’s communities.

**Difficult DDR process due to poor planning and lack of precise figures.** In fact, there was more than one DDR campaign during the Sierra Leone war. Each time, the international community, acting in good faith, was convinced that hostilities were really at an end and the time to demobilize combatants had finally arrived, only to witness the war recommence. As a result, in three phases over four years, a total of 72,000 combatants were disarmed and demobilized, and some 31,000 SALW collected and destroyed.

The authors of the joint report noted that the high combatant figures were due to the fact that many combatants were demobilized more than once, as a result of the repeated resurgences in fighting. In all DDR campaigns, ex-combatants received modest individual benefit packages.

It is difficult to be critical of these setbacks, but not on other details of the demobilization process. Initially, the demobilization ratio had been one person, one weapon. But this proved to be inappropriate since commanders saw it as an attack on their authority. The formula was replaced by group disarmament, which was certainly more efficient, but allowed commanders a great deal of discretion as to whom to include and a result a great number of people were excluded. The number of people entering the program, therefore, no longer matched the numbers of weapons collected, and this left an unknown number of SALW in circulation in Sierra Leone. Much the same thing was to happen in Burundi – during the demobilization of FNL forces in 2009, the formula of one weapon per combatant was also not followed, and in the end, few SALW were turned over.

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Women and youth were also largely excluded from the DDR processes. During the war the government had set up Civilian Defence Forces (CDF) throughout the country, mainly youth, mostly armed with shotguns and machetes. The CDF were excluded from the DDR processes, leading to widespread resentment and tensions in various regions of the country. In addition to overlooking the Civilian Defence Forces, DDR also excluded women from the rebel movements, who though for the most part had not been combatants, nevertheless had demobilization and reintegration needs in their own right.

Similar to the case of Albania, if a gender-sensitive approach is not pursued, then women tend to be absent in decision-making and as beneficiaries. In a separate study by the Women Waging Peace Program, the authors noted that, in fact, girls and young women had played an integral role in the CDF, in numerous roles, from medics to frontline fighters. Women also made up a large part of rebel RUF forces, in a number of different roles (Mazurana and Carlson, 2004). DDR failed women and girls since they were mostly classified as “dependents,” their real experiences were not acknowledged, and consequently, they were precluded from receiving benefits or reintegration support provided to combatants (Mazurana and Carlson, 2004).

According to the authors, the almost complete lack of figures and data was a major problem in Sierra Leone’s post-conflict period. There were no health or crime statistics for example, not just a lack of estimates on the number of small arms in circulation. Not surprising given that what little institutional capacity had been available before the war, had completely ceased to function during the 11-year conflict.

**Successful Arms for Development initiative.** In order to deal with the residual SALW problem, the government with the support of UNDP launched the Arms for Development initiative in November 2002. The four guiding principles of the AfD initiative are listed in Box 3.4. In each of Sierra Leone’s 149 chiefdoms, communities were encouraged to surrender

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46 A final government attempt at controlling SALW prior to the AfD was the Community Arms Collection and Destruction Program (CACD), carried out between February and April 2002. CACD recovered 9,600 small arms and about 35,000 assorted pieces of ammunition, however the program was unable to cover the entire country due to constraints in logistics. The final report also noted that there had been poor cooperation from communities and not all weapons had been surrendered.

47 Sierra Leone has three provinces, divided into 14 districts. The 14 districts are further divided into some 10-20 chiefdoms each, which is the third-level of administration in the country. West African chiefdoms
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their weapons, after which the Sierra Leone Police carried out a random search of the communities. When no weapons were found, the chiefdom was awarded a weapons-free certificate and a substantial incentive, a grant of approximately $15,000, a relatively large sum in that context, for the implementation of a community development project.

According to the authors, the achievement of a weapons-free status was guaranteed, because the process of disarmament was community-led in a context of close kin and social ties with virtually no secrets among its members. In other words, everyone in the community would know if someone had still not handed in his or her weapon, putting extreme community pressure on that individual to surrender the weapon. Consultations were held for the choice of the community project in each chiefdom. The final selection was made by secret ballot by all sections of the chiefdom, including women, youth, elders, and so on. Implementation of the project was the responsibility of the community, with the support of UNDP.

Given that there are no reliable figures on the extent of the SALW problem in the post-conflict period, success of the AfD initiative could be assumed through the certification process described above, and, in the fact that personal testimonies noted the difficulty of finding weapons to purchase, in comparison to the war years. According to the authors of the UNIDIR-UNDP joint report, the reasons for the success of the AfD initiative included the fact that disarmament and aid had begun during the conflict; foreign military intervention, resulting in a coercive demobilization process; and good inter-agency cooperation and coordination. But the biggest reason for success in Sierra Leone, according to the authors, was “we don’t know”.

In fact it is not well understood why the AfD initiative worked, similar to the case in Cambodia. Observers have noted that there was a general feeling among people that the war was done with, a general fatigue with war, and there were no more reasons to have a gun. Obviously understanding the reasons behind this popular sentiment is important, in order to see how programs can be designed around it, if possible.

Chiefdoms are a form of social organization in which a chief and his inner group rule a territory and its communities. Chiefdoms are hereditary, and tend to have at least two inherited social classes, elite and commoner. They are organized around kinship, and personal status is usually linked to the distance between the person and the main ancestor of the chiefdom.
Socio-cultural expertise in a complex context. The biggest setback of the initiative, according to the authors, was the lack of support towards achieving a solid understanding of the socio-cultural context. Throughout the joint report, there are references to uncertainty about responses to the survey, for example how what was “not” said in interviews could be just as important as what was said. In general, the researchers were aware how much they did not know, and they realized there were certain issues about which they knew next to nothing. Indeed, much of Sierra Leone society, like others in West Africa, is made up “secret societies”, in addition to clans, chiefdoms and ethnic groups, which are difficult to recognize for outsiders or those uninitiated: however they are key to the functioning of the society, and decisions taken by the leaders of these societies can have huge impacts. The frustration of the researchers was based on the awareness that there was anthropological and ethnographic expertise on Sierra Leone society and culture, “somewhere out there,” but that no link had been made between those cultural experts and the staff of the disarmament initiative.

Lack of coordination for technical support. The researchers felt a lack of coordination for receiving technical support. Similar to the lack of support on socio-cultural issues, there was frustration that experts in civilian disarmament published what needed to be done, but not how it needed to be done, which was so necessary for local staff. In the end, according to the report authors, the situation was still one of isolated field managers alone with their small staff and limited resources, far away from the experts in the topic. This contrasts with the experience of EU-ASAC in Cambodia, in which experienced specialists were responsible for each program component.

Porous borders and arms trafficking. The government of Sierra Leone lost control over large sections of its international borders during the civil war, and in general, fighters and weapons moved throughout the West African region as one country after another ignited in armed conflict during the 1990s. As an example, the authors note that numerous Sierra Leone fighters opted to demobilize in nearby Côte d'Ivoire, because the demobilization benefit package was better in that country.
Concluding remarks to Chapter 3. There are numerous lessons learned, and key issues related to civilian disarmament that have been produced from these four case studies. As noted at the conclusion of Chapter 2, a list of good policy and good practice indicators, taken from these two chapters, will be included in point form in Appendix A. The idea is to have a quick reference guide for discussion of civilian disarmament efforts in Burundi. In the next chapter, attention returns to Burundi and its tragic history of armed violence, with a focus on the use, demand and supply of weapons during the civil war.
CHAPTER 4
THE 1993 – 2006 CIVIL WAR IN BURUNDI

4.1 Post independence crises, 1962 – 1993
The 1993 civil war is only the latest tragic chapter in Burundi’s history. Since independence from Belgium in July 1962, and prior to the 1993 conflict, there were at least four major national crises involving inter-ethnic massacres of either Hutu or Tutsi civilians or both, or members of one political party or other, or various – in the wake of a Tutsi-led coup d’état in October 1965, in the wake of an invasion by Hutu rebels in April 1972, in August 1988 after another revolt, and in November 1991 (Vandeginste, 2007).

The levels of victimization and trauma in society in the wake of civil war and those previous crises are immense. Observers consider Burundians to be exhibiting signs similar to post-traumatic stress disorders (Sebudandi, 2009). Each cycle of violence in Burundi has been characterized by nearly total impunity, with the perpetrators living freely in their communities, and as a result people have become accustomed to fear of retribution and revenge (Scoulier, 2008).

Overlooking the commune of Kinindo, Bujumbura, and the silhouette of the DR Congo mountains across Lake Tanganyika, March 2008 (Charlie Avendaño)
4.2  Bujumbura during the 1993 – 2006 civil war

The war was also fought in the streets of Bujumbura, the country’s capital and only significant urban centre. On and off through the years there was severe fighting between rebel factions, government forces, and armed youth militias from both sides, in numerous parts of the city. As a result of the war, entire neighbourhoods became cleansed of one or the other ethnic group, with large numbers of people being killed as well as displaced.

One of the worse episodes of armed violence in the capital occurred in March 1995, when extremist Tutsi “Sans échec” and “Sans defaite” militias unleashed targeted violence in two of the city’s most multi-ethnic neighbourhoods, Bwiza and Buyenzi. Before the war, Hutu, Tutsi, people of mixed heritage, as well as Congolese, Tanzanians, and West African communities lived there. After several days of uncontrolled violence much of the two neighbourhoods were left in ruins, hundreds of corpses lay in the streets and more than 10,000 people had fled to camps near the DRC border.48

The Mauritanian diplomat Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, who served as UN Special Envoy to Burundi in the early years of the civil war (1993-1995), later wrote regarding the March 1995 fighting in the city:

“For those three days [22-24 March 1995] there was a severe breakdown of authority in the capital… the Tutsi extremists had various reasons for the attacks: to ransack wealthy traders, looting businesses and homes; to put an end to harmonious coexistence where it existed; and to embarrass the army by forcing it either to participate in the looting and killing of Hutu, or to repress it. For Hutu extremists, the March 1995 violence exposed the army’s inability to maintain law and order in the capital and thus to put pressure on the international community to dispatch troops to protect Burundi’s democracy” (Ould-Abdallah, 2000, 45).

48 “Thousands Flee Fighting in Burundi’s Capital,” NY Times, 26 March 1995. Remaining Hutu in Bwiza, trying to put out house fires while the Tutsi-dominated army watched from armored vehicles, reacted angrily to the NY Times and most of them refused to be interviewed. But some did note that the army had trucked away hundreds of corpses at dawn.
“I accuse you.”

Burundian actors rehearsing a play on the civil war, Bujumbura, September 2007
(Charlie Avendaño)

In 2007 and 2008 a multi-ethnic theatre group toured the country presenting a play on the recent conflict and post-conflict justice issues prior to national consultations on transitional justice mechanisms. The theatre group was supported by the Belgian NGO, RCN Justice & Démocratie.

Not surprisingly, working class Tutsi civilians in the city had another assessment of the situation in which they found themselves at the time. Surrounded as they were by Hutu populations in parts of the city and in the encircling Bujumbura Rurale Province, and with hundreds of kilometers of mostly hostile territory to cross before safety in Rwanda or Tanzania, they felt trapped as well as sheltered in the city, and the war for them was a matter of collective survival within four walls. 49

4.3 Arming militias and government workers during the war

The number of small arms in circulation in Burundi increased sharply during the 1993 – 2006 civil war. There were two main reasons: the government and the rebels training and arming youth militias; and second, the Burundian government arming its workers and other civilians, for self-protection.

Informal conversations with cab drivers of Tutsi ethnicity, Bujumbura, December 2009.
Taking Risks With Peace in Burundi

**Successive governments provide weapons to youth militias.** Already during the crisis in 1972 the government had provided small arms to civilian youth, including the “Jeunesses révolutionnaires rwagasore” (JRR) that were implicated in the atrocities of that time (Rackley, 2005; Lemarchand, 2002). As mentioned above, after 1993, the extremist Tutsi militias “Sans échec” and “Sans defaite” were active in Bujumbura, often carrying out extreme human rights violations including summary executions at seemingly impromptu road check points in the city (Rieff, 2001).

During the war the government also formed and trained the “Gardiens de la Paix” militias throughout the country. According to the Small Arms Survey, the Gardiens de la Paix militias were of several different types. Some were young men recruited, under the army’s advice, by local administrators for personal protection against rebel attacks. At first they went unarmed, but as time passed they increasingly armed themselves with supplies from army stockpiles, with apparently little oversight from the army. Other Gardiens were youth who provided logistical assistance to the army and received weapons for personal protection. It seemed most kept them but there are no figures (Pézard and Florquin, 2007). According to Dan Church Aid, the Gardiens in places like Ruyigi Province were ethnically mixed (Forbes, 2007). There have been strong indications that many Gardiens de la Paix were not adequately demobilized, and kept their weapons (Forbes, 2007). The issue of inadequate demobilization and/or reintegration youth militia remains a major security-related problem that will need to be addressed in Burundi (see Chapter 7 and 8).

**Pro-government civil defence groups given weapons as well.** The government over the years also provided weapons to important members of the administration, civil servants, and other supporters for their own protection. Organized into “Groupes pour l’autodefense civile”, they were far fewer than the Gardiens. As of August 2007, lists of those in the Groupes who had received weapons were lost or non-existent and the number of weapons distributed were unknown. The number of state employees that were given weapons is estimated at 5,000 and in August 2007 it was assumed that most of them still had their weapons (Pézard and Florquin, 2007).
Rebel militias also active. The CNDD-FDD and other Hutu rebel groups also had their own militia, collectively called the “Militant Combatants.” According to the Small Arms Survey, many shared weapons since they were generally in short supply. They also assisted the CNDD-FDD by providing intelligence about army positions and movements, supplying combatants with food and other resources, and carrying the wounded (Small Arms Survey, 2007).

Typical for the Burundian context, there are no precise figures on the numbers of militias or information on the weapons handed out. A report by the Brussels-based research group GRIP put the enrolment in government self-defence programs at an estimated 30,000, but that was only a rough estimate (Rackley, 2005).
4.4 SALW demand and supply during the civil war

SALW demand. In a context such as that of Burundi after 1993, for self-protection civilians will also arm themselves in large numbers. The 2005 GRIP study on the impact of SALW and armed violence on women, based on research carried out in August-October 2004, estimated that up to 80% of Burundian households could be armed (Rackley, 2005), but that figure is not backed-up by other sources. Nevertheless, civilian men at the time certainly saw the possession of a weapon at home as an “insurance policy” (Rackley, 2005). As both government forces and various rebel groups grew in size, and as both sides sought to arm their respective militias, there was of course a huge spike in the demand for weapons from all sides in Burundi.

By the 1990s there was also greater-than-ever international awareness of the lucrative transfer of small arms and light weapons and their significant impact on localized conflicts around the globe, particularly in Africa. As demand for SALW increased after the civil war began, there was also greater attention being paid to the weapons merchants. In that sense, the 1993 – 2006 Burundian civil war was not at all “off the international radar”, like previous crises in the country to varying degrees had been. Since the arrival of Ould-Abdallah as UN Special Envoy in November 1993, there has been significant international involvement in Burundian affairs. In 2006, Burundi was one of two countries along with Sierra Leone that became focus countries for the new UN Peacebuilding Commission, eligible for grants from the Peacebuilding Fund (Discussed in Chapter 7).

Regional availability of SALW. Events elsewhere in Central Africa during the 1990s resulted in SALW weapons flooding into Burundi. As far as state and non-state actors in Burundi seeking weapons were concerned, two developments stood out (Rackley, 2005):

(i) The disintegration of the former Rwandan Army (FAR) in 1994-95 followed by the flight of ex-combatants across the region and into Burundi specifically, where they sold off weapons and munitions in large numbers, often very cheaply (e.g. a Kalashnikov rifle commonly went for $100); and,

(ii) The disintegration of the Zairean Army (FAZ) in 1996 resulting in another influx of weapons and munitions into Burundi.

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50 That is, after more than ten years of civil war, and after the November 2003 ceasefire with the CNDD-FDD, but months before the elections of mid-2005 and long before the end of fighting with the FNL.
Weak or non-existent arms embargoes. After the coup d’état of July 1996 that saw Pierre Buyoya, a former president and a Tutsi military officer, installed in power, in August 1996 the first arms embargo targeting Burundi was put in place. It was an embargo at the regional level only, and proved to be ineffective, not least because many of the countries that imposed the regional embargo were the ones from where SALW supplies originated (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

Also in August 1996, the UN Security Council, via Resolution 1072 on a comprehensive political settlement of the crisis in the country, had decided to at least consider the imposition of an international embargo if there was no progress towards peace. The embargo would entail a ban “on the sale or supply of arms and related materiel of all types to the regime in Burundi and to all factions inside or outside Burundi, and measures targeted against the leaders the regime and all factions who continue to encourage violence” (UN Security Council, 1996).

Two and a half years later, in January 1999, Human Rights Watch was still calling for an international arms embargo to replace the ineffective regional one, and extending it to all sides in the conflict, including rebel groups. The human rights organization noted that both sides continued to arm themselves “at an alarming pace,” and thanks to the inflow of arms and ammunition, the army had begun an aggressive recruitment drive with new recruits being armed with AKM and AK-47 Kalashnikov rifles (Human Rights Watch, 1999). An international arms embargo on Burundi was never put into place.

The December 1997 “Stoking the Fires” report on arms transfers to Burundi. The Human Rights Watch report “Stoking the Fires: Military Assistance, Arms Trafficking and the Civil War in Burundi” blew the lid on the rush by weapons merchants of all stripes to profit from the Burundian conflict. A not very strategically important civil war in Central Africa it might have been, but it was going to be good business for the weapons industry, the locals be damned.
On the basis of four years of research (1993-1997), “Stoking the Fires” documented how there was a seemingly unstoppable flow of arms towards all parties to the Burundian conflict, with the regional arms embargo having no effect whatsoever on the flow of weapons. Based on this evidence, Human Rights Watch called for an international arms embargo on all sides of the conflict, and the deployment of military monitors to the region to ensure that weapons would not enter Burundi (Human Rights Watch, 1997).

Human Rights Watch also named members of the international community that were arms suppliers, provided other forms of military assistance to the parties, or failed to take effective steps to stop the arms flow from private dealers, tolerating corruption and illegal activities (see ____________).

51 At dawn on 30 April 1997, rebel CNDD-FDD fighters attacked the small Catholic seminary in Buta, in the south of the country. Students refused to split into Tutsi and Hutu groups when the combatants demanded it and consequently were massacred together. A monument and cemetery were built on the site to honour the 40 seminarians killed.
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Box 4.1) (Human Rights Watch, 1997). Belgium, the former colonial power, came in for criticism. Human Rights Watch claimed that by the mid-1990s the port of Oostende had taken over as the major hub for international trafficking to the Burundian parties, mostly from Eastern Europe. Gunrunners from Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Turkmenistan and the Ukraine were using Belgium-based pilots and cargo-handlers to transport small arms to Burundi via Angola, South Africa, and Zaïre (Human Rights Watch, 1997).

A February 1998 incident illustrated the extent of the weapons trafficking networks. A cargo plane flying from Bulgaria had been grounded in Lagos, Nigeria, as it was attempting to refuel. After finding arms onboard, Nigerian authorities detained the crew as well as a Burundian military officer, who happened to be a key aide to President Buyoya (Human Rights Watch, 1999). And that was just one flight of many. On the other hand in 1998 rebel groups continued to be supplied South African-sourced weapons trafficked via Zambia or the eastern DRC and then across Lake Tanganyika (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

Additional research on the supply of SALW. Additional information on the supply of small arms and light weapons during the civil war years comes from the 2007 Small Arms Survey special report on disarmament in Burundi, based on research carried out in November-December 2005, just after the CNDD election victories. The report noted that rebel forces in general had to buy their small arms in the DRC, Rwanda and Tanzania, or capture them from the military.

A major source of weapons was South Kivu in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, bordering with Burundi and only a few kilometres from Bujumbura – a good illustration of the essentially regional dimension of African conflicts. During the conflict it was always much easier to get a SALW in the DRC – particularly from armed Congolese groups – than in Burundi. Many Burundian rebel groups had rear bases in South Kivu as well, making the transactions easy.
Reportedly there was also leasing of weapons between armed factions, in exchange for goods, food, stolen cows and so on (Pézard and Florquin, 2007).

The Small Arms Survey report also indicated that Tanzania appeared to be a major source of arms with the majority of the arms held by the Palipehutu-FNL coming from that country, through Lake Tanganyika, unloaded in the ports of Minago, Rumonge, Karonda, Mugina, and Nyanza Lac. The arms were usually hidden in sacks and port authorities either turned a blind eye for fear of reprisals from the FNL or because they were bribed to do so (Pézard and Florquin, 2007). The region of Kigoma, Tanzania – then the site of massive refugee camps, with people from throughout the region, was also used as a rear base by Burundian rebel groups. Kigoma was also a major source of weapons such as Kalashnikovs, light machine guns and grenades (Pézard and Florquin, 2007).

The types of SALW held by rebel groups in Burundi, as reported by the Small Arms Survey, gives a good indication of the variety of weapons that could be obtained by Burundian state and non-state actors (See Box 4.3). There are weapons manufactured in Austria, Belgium, China, Germany, Israel, Russia and the United States. However the type of weapon and country of manufacture says little about where the weapons originated. If the weapon no longer has a serial number or other identification then it is not possible to trace it. For example, an AK-47 assault rifle manufactured (under license or not) could have come from numerous countries. The route could be as complex as Azerbaijan to Burundi via Belgium and South Africa.

### Box 4.2
**Stoking the Fires: Supply routes**

- Angola, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaïre/DRC permitted the shipment of weapons through their territory or in some cases allowed rebels to establish bases.
- There were direct flights with arms for government forces from Europe, Central and Southern Africa.
- Arms merchants took advantage of loose restrictions on arms transfers, poor controls at border points and corrupt officials.
**Concluding remarks to Chapter 4.** In this chapter a brief mention has been made of the historic legacy of the civil war in Burundi. With regards to the presence of small arms in the country, a feature of the civil war was the handing out of large numbers of SALW to militias and civil defence groups, with little or no information on the numbers, users, or final destination of those weapons. In terms of supply, a landmark 1997 Human Rights Watch report showed the extent of the arms supply network that fuelled the violence, and how the regional arms embargo was utterly ineffective. In Chapter 5, the focus turns to the extent of the weapons problem after the war, that is, how many SALW are circulating in Burundi post-conflict, and whether there are differences between regions and provinces in terms of the SALW problem.

**Box 4.3**

**SALW in Burundi**

- Pistols: Browning 1093, Glock 17, Makarov, Mauser HSC, Tokarev
- Automatic rifles: AKSU-74, Chinese type 56s, CZ 58, Dragunov SVD, FN FAL, G4, AK-47, AK-74, M4
- Sub-machine guns: Ruger MP-9, US M3, Uzi
- Machine-guns: FN MAG, FN. Minimi, Goryunov SG43, PKs, RPD
- Grenades
- Mortars (60 mm, 120 mm)
- Rocket-propelled RPG-7 grenades.
- Anti-personnel and anti-tank mines
CHAPTER 5
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN CIVILIAN HANDS

5.1 Previous figures on the number of SALW in civilian hands

As expected, putting a number on the small arm and light weapon problem in post-conflict Burundi is a difficult task. In 2005, GRIP\(^{52}\) published a study on the impact of SALW on Burundian women, based on research carried out between August and October 2004. At that time, GRIP reported that up to 80% of Burundian households potentially possessed a small arm (Rackley, 2005). However, research since then has shown that figure to have been exaggerated, and it is no longer in use.

In January 2005, the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, in a letter to the UN Security Council, noted that insecurity in Burundi was compounded by the “estimated 300,000 guns” in the hands of “various military groups engaged in the peace process, as well as militias, local defence forces and insurgents in Burundi” (UN Security Council, 2005a).\(^{53}\) No information was provided on how that figure was determined, nor was the term “gun” defined. The figure of 300,000 guns was again included in the Secretary-General’s Third Report on ONUB in March 2005, and then a third time, in a June 2005 report by the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi of the UN Economic and Social Council (UN Security Council, 2005b; UN Economic and Social Council, 2005).

The most recent and most quoted figure on the number of small arms and light weapons in circulation in Burundi comes from a Small Arms Survey special research report, carried out with the support of the Burundian human rights organization Ligue Iteka, published in August 2007, based mainly on the results of a survey of a representative sample of Burundian households that was carried out in November-December 2005. The research was commissioned by UNDP, and was to be the basis for the civilian disarmament project funded through the UN Peacebuilding Fund (discussed in Chapter 7).

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\(^{53}\) The UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo was created by UN Security Council Resolution 1533, adopted on 12 March 2004 (UN Doc. S/RES/1533). Under its mandate (paragraph 10(b)), the UN Group of Experts was tasked with gathering and analyzing “all relevant information in the DRC, countries of the region and, as necessary, in other countries, in cooperation with the governments of those countries, flows of arms and related materiel, as well as networks operating in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of Resolution 1493” (adopted by the UN Security Council on 28 July 2003).
The special report concluded that depending on the province, at that time five to twenty-five percent of Burundian households possessed at least one SALW (Pézard and Florquin, 2007) (The political map of Burundi is found in Appendix B):

- **Bujumbura Mairie**: Rate of one weapon per four households (25%).
- **Northern and southern provinces** (Bubanza, Bujumbura Rurale, Bururi, Cibitoke, and Makamaba): Rate of one weapon per ten households (10%).
- **Rest of the country** (see below): Rate of one weapon per twenty households (5%).

Multiplying these SALW ownership rates by the number of households per province suggested that some 100,000 households possessed at least one SALW (Small Arms Survey, 2007), so consequently at that time there were at least 100,000 SALW in civilian hands.

Two observations can be made regarding this figure, which has been widely used by the media and others since it was published. One, as the researchers themselves already noted in August 2007, by the date it was published it was already out of date (Pézard and Florquin, 2007). Yet during research for this report, some four years after the surveys were conducted, the figure was still being quoted. Second, it was only an estimate, and as a recent report from International Alert noted, the lack of data and statistics is the ‘Achilles Heel’ of peacebuilding and development policies in Burundi (Sebudandi, 2009).

Solid baseline data is important for programming and for subsequently assessing how much of an impact an action is having, and how many weapons remain out there. For those reasons, it is emphasized in the OECD guidelines as well as in the lessons learned in previous initiatives (Chapter 3) (OECD, 2009; OECD, 2007a). However in places like Burundi, it is difficult to have solid baseline data because for years there has been no functioning national institution responsible for statistics. It is not only with regards to SALW that there is uncertainty in the figures. Travel within the country was often restricted during the conflict years. The last national census was carried out in 1990 prior to the civil war, and until the census of August 2008 population figures were also rough estimates.\(^{54} \) After the conflict, it was also necessary to identify the precise number of police and military personnel.

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\(^{54}\) See “Burundi: 3ème recensement de la population,” 22 July 2008, at
Other factors as well confound attempts for precision in the SALW figures. As discussed in a later chapter, incomplete disarmament of ex-combatants including militia will have added to SALW in circulation, but there’s also no information available on those figures. The regional movement in weapons that went on for years in order to supply the Burundian factions certainly adds to the uncertainty in any figure. Research carried out by GRIP in April 2004 made clear that up to that time, the border between the DRC and Burundi had been “totally porous” (since 1993). The movement of weapons was mostly from the DRC into Burundi and not the other way around (Ntibarikure, 2006).

Seen from the perspective of good policy and good practice however, these are precisely why solid baseline data is necessary prior to any disarmament initiative. Taking into account that current estimates are based on Small Arms Survey research from late 2005, one recommendation of this research project points at the need to eventually have additional survey work done, that produces reliable figures on the number of SALW in circulation in Burundi.

5.2 Differences between provinces on the scope of the SALW problem

As noted above there are differences between provinces when it comes to the scope of the problem and impact of SALW. Unsurprisingly the scope of the problem is greater where the conflict was most intense (Small Arms Survey, 2007; Ntibarikure, 2006):

- **Bujumbura Mairie**, the capital, with the highest rate of civilian SALW possession in the country.
- **Northern, western and southern provinces** where much of the fighting took place and the population became heavily armed: Bubanza, Bujumbura Rurale, Bururi, Cibitoke, and Makamba.
- **Central and eastern provinces** where fighting was not as acute and SALW possession is less of a problem.\(^{55}\)

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\(^{55}\) Cankuzo, Gitega, Karuzi, Kayanza, Kirundo, Mwaro, Muyunga, Ngozi, Rutana, and Ruyigi. See Appendix B for a political map of Burundi.
It should be kept in mind that such differences are in degree, and at different times during the civil war there was intense fighting in most provinces. At the end of 1996 for example, rebel attacks and counter-operations by the army claimed large number of victims among the civilian population in Muramvya Province in central Burundi, which was relatively calm in other years (UN Security Council, 1997).

According to the Small Arms Survey’s 2005 research, there were also differences between provinces when it came to the types of SALW present. In the entire country, assault rifles and grenades were common but in Bujumbura Mairie, in addition, handguns (pistols, revolvers) were held in large numbers (Small Arms Survey, 2007). Data on the differences of the scope of the SALW problem according to region and province also needs to be updated, as noted above.

5.3 Homemade “Mugobore” small arms

As if the SALW problem was not enough for post-conflict Burundi, there is an additional problem with the production and use of homemade, artisanal weapons called “Mugobore”. According to the 2005 GRIP study on SALW, armed violence and their impact on women, when rebel movements became active in 1994, they depended on their rural support base to supply them with weapons. Industrial-grade weapons were scarce and expensive at the time, and at first many combatants used machetes and other traditional weapons. Farmers then began fabricating mugobore to supply the rebels (Rackley, 2005).

A mugobore looks like a toy rifle put together with wood, a metal tube, and rubber straps. The firing mechanism is not a trigger but a coiled spring that is pulled from the butt of the rifle and released. Even if they look like toys at first glance, and they have no accuracy at any distance, at point-blank range they can severely injure or kill a victim. After the onset of the civil war, the know-how for fabricating Mugobore unfortunately spread throughout the country. By late 2004, according to GRIP, they were the weapons of choice for rural bandits operating in the war's margins, preying on civilians. They were also commonly used in sexual violence. They cost the equivalent of $10 (Rackley, 2005), not cheap by Burundian standards but a fraction of the cost of an industrially produced small arm.
Concluding remarks to Chapter 5. Available figures on the small arms and light weapons in
civilian hands (that is, in circulation in Burundi and outside government control) are estimates
from late 2005. There was regional variation on the number and types of SALW, with
Bujumbura, the capital, most affected. The use of homemade “mugobore” hand weapons has
spread throughout the country. In the next chapter attention is turned to the impact that small
arms and light weapons have in Burundi.
CHAPTER 6
ARMED VIOLENCE AND VIEWS ON CIVILIAN DISARMAMENT

The demand, supply and distribution of small arms and light weapons during the civil war, including research showing how weapons trafficking fed the armed conflict, were discussed in Chapter 4. The residual SALW problem in the country, based on information that is available, was discussed in Chapter 5. The need for updated baseline data was noted. In this chapter, attention turns to armed violence in post-conflict Burundi and its economic, psychological and social impact. The impact of SALW underlines the majority view among civilians that disarmament is a requirement for reconciliation.

Fortunately, over the past few years several important research projects have been carried out in the areas of security, small arms, and disarmament. The research covers five key years, spanning from late 2004, when the conflict was still active, until 2009, when the FNL agreed to demobilize. The research projects are: research on the impact of SALW on women, carried out by GRIP in August-October 2004; research by the Small Arms Survey, on the role of SALW in post-conflict insecurity and the situation in Bujumbura, carried out between September 2005 and June 2006; a rapid assessment of the impact of small arms in the interior provinces, and the prospects for civilian disarmament, carried out by Dan Church Aid in August 2007; an assessment of armed violence by the Small Arms Survey in January-March 2008; and lastly, research by International Alert on women’s perspectives on security, carried out in June 2009.

6.1 Armed violence in Burundi

National figures. Post-conflict armed violence has a significant impact, affecting reconstruction and development efforts. While levels of armed violence have obviously decreased from the height of the civil war, current research indicates that crime-related armed violence, rather than stabilizing or decreasing as the civil war ended, may in fact have become a generalized, routine

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...event (Small Arms Survey, 2009; Forbes, 2007). This would parallel experiences in other post-conflict contexts, such as El Salvador: instead of a post-conflict “peace dividend,” armed violence continues and violent crime escalates (Nichols, 2006). The UN Secretary-General’s sixth report on the UN mission in Burundi (November 2009) noted that in the period May to November 2009 there had been a “worrisome increase in overall criminality throughout the country, particularly armed violence”. Persistent insecurity was attributed to several factors including the prevalence of small arms and light weapons (UN Security Council, 2009). Post-conflict armed violence is a serious problem in Burundi.

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<td>- 1,882 acts of armed violence recorded by UNDP.</td>
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<td>- 50% related to acts of banditry.</td>
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<td>- 5.6% related to land disputes.</td>
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<td>- 4.9% related to domestic disputes.</td>
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<td>- 4.2% related to acts of the (then) last active rebel faction, FNL.</td>
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Research on the type of armed violence, carried out in early 2008 by the Small Arms Survey, with the support of the Burundian human rights NGO Ligue Iteka, found that the vast majority (88.4%) of survey respondents identified banditry as, by far, the most frequently observed type of armed violence.\(^{61}\) By that time, armed violence directly linked to the armed conflict was a rare event for most people (see Box 6.1). In terms of perpetrators and victims of armed violence, Ligue Iteka research in 2007 showed that the vast majority of armed offences recorded by the police were committed by men (97%), half of them between 19 and 30 years of age. Three-quarters (76%) of the victims of armed violence were men, and in approximately 25% of acts of armed violence one or more female victims were involved. Overall, there were one or more fatalities in 70% of acts of armed violence, indicating the degree of violence involved. Automatic assault rifles, grenades and handguns were the most common small arms in circulation, with the significant use of grenades being characteristic of Burundi (22% of acts of armed violence in 2008). Grenades have the same dissuasive and coercive powers as firearms, but cost much less and have the capacity to injure or kill many people simultaneously. Grenades are used to settle political scores, as well as for criminal reasons (see Box 6.2) (Small Arms Survey, 2009).

\(^{61}\) Banditry is the activity of bandits – armed outlaws, robbers and murderers – who may act alone but more often in groups. Activities include home and business burglaries, highway ambushes, hold-ups, and so on (Concise Oxford Dictionary).
**Economic impact.** Banditry and lawlessness are at such alarmingly high levels that in some places in the interior of the country they are putting a significant brake on economic activity and development. Already in late 2004 GRIP reported that agricultural production in the north had decreased because people were afraid of armed assault in the fields and rural roads, and as a result were avoiding going to tend to their crops. In a context where everyone knows everyone else at the local level, successful traders and businessmen were especially vulnerable to banditry since their trucks were easily recognized. Even market prices were affected, since stolen goods and produce were often resold at much less than their market value (Rackley, 2005). In Cancuzo, Makamba and Ruyigi – provinces in the east and south east that were relatively less affected by the civil war – economic activity had actually atrophied because of armed bandits operating on rural roads between markets and villages (Rackley, 2005). As noted in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4), the OECD DAC emphasizes that good practice has to take into account what local populations in post-conflict contexts above all desire, which is concrete improvements of security in the sense of safety from physical and armed attacks (OECD, 2009).

However, three years later, research by Dan Church Aid again found that fear of banditry in provinces of the interior was paralyzing economic development, regardless of the fact that fighting between the FNL and the army had wound down in most of the country. People were discouraged from starting small businesses, making improvements to their houses or even selling crops after a good harvest – because a visible increase in wealth made that person an instant target for criminals (Forbes, 2007).

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**Box 6.2**

**Grenades: abundant, cheap, and easy to use**

- In March 2008, assailants threw grenades into the homes of 4 opposition parliamentarians who had signed a letter asking for international protection from government harassment.

- In July 2008, men on motorcycles threw grenades against two UN vehicles in Bujumbura; at a time when there were labour disputes with former local UN employees.

- In December 2008, eight family members were seriously injured when a bandit threw a grenade at them as he tried to flee with a stolen goat.


- According to media, in July 2010 a grenade reportedly cost as little as $3.
The economic impact of being wounded by a bullet can be catastrophic for an individual and his family. According to the Small Arms Survey, the medical expenses due to a bullet wound can reach $400, an astronomical sum in a country where 70% of the population lives below the poverty line, and more than half survive on less than a dollar a day.\textsuperscript{62} Not surprisingly, Médicins sans Frontières (MSF) data from the mid-2000s revealed that three of four Burundians who used the public health facilities were forced to go into debt, or sell their possessions, in order to pay their medical bills (Small Arms Survey, 2007). Moreover, research carried out by Human Rights Watch in 2006 revealed that the practice of hospitals ‘detaining’ former patients because they were unable to pay their bills was a routine event in Burundi, regardless of it being a violation of a number of human rights established in international law. Though numbers were impossible to estimate due to the lack of data, 9 of 11 hospitals visited by the researchers had former patients detained. Typical conditions of detention included overcrowding, insufficient food and water, and withholding of further medical treatment. Seventy-two per cent of patients interviewed had been detained for one month or longer at the time (Kippenberg, Sahokwasama and Amon, 2008). In addition, Burundi in the mid-2000s had less than half the necessary doctors and specialists, and those it did count on were heavily concentrated in Bujumbura (80%), leaving the rest of the country with only the most basic of health services (Small Arms Survey, 2007).

\textit{Psychological and social impact.} The levels of victimization and trauma in Burundian society are high. The psychological consequences of being a victim of armed violence must be added to the economic consequences. All the research reports note the presence of fear of armed violence in everyday life. GRIP research in late 2004 found women and children in the southern Makamba province to be living in “generalized panic” from armed violence and banditry in a context of nearly total impunity for perpetrators. People feared retribution if they spoke up about the problem. Their movement was restricted, and few people ventured out after dark (Rackley, 2005). Similarly, research carried out in early 2008 by the Small Arms Survey and Ligue Iteka concluded that for many people, armed violence tended to take place at night and inside their homes. Chillingly, more than 40% of survey respondents reported that they did not feel safe in their own homes at night. According to the researchers, this contrasted with armed violence in other African countries, which for the most part took place in the streets (Small Arms Survey,

2009). Though the psychological impact of armed violence is significant, Burundi has only minimal mental health facilities and there are no psychiatrists in the country (Small Arms Survey, 2009; Ntibarikure, 2006).

Research by Dan Church Aid in August 2007 found that armed violence weakened social cohesion, and potentially, the capacity of communities to resist ethnic and political turbulence in the years to come. People tended to avoid quarrels and therefore often avoided settling genuine disputes and grievances out of fear of armed retribution – because it was hard to know who had a weapon and who did not, and therefore who could potentially exact armed retribution. This undermined trust between family members and between neighbours. According to Dan Church Aid research, people in general are now less likely to help one another, hence the danger of reduced capacity to resist turbulence down the road (Forbes, 2007). Three years earlier, GRIP

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63 Lack of knowledge of who possesses a weapon is compounded by uncertainty about who may not have a weapon but is ready to hire someone to throw a grenade in retribution. Grenade use continues unabated. In July 2010, as the country faced national presidential elections that were eventually boycotted by the opposition, there had been 60 grenade attacks in Bujumbura alone. See Delany, M. “Blasts of $3 grenades rock Burundi’s fragile peace,” Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), 2 July 2010.
had also noted the lack of trust between individuals and the lack of any sense of solidarity among Burundians (Rackley, 2005). According to the OECD DAC, civilian disarmament and security sector work in general is fundamental to rebuilding trust and working towards reconciliation – by removing weapons from society, and by developing professional security agencies that follow the rule of law.

*Bujumbura Mairie.* In Chapter 5 it was noted that Bujumbura had the highest rate of civilian SALW possession in the country. Pistols and revolvers were also held in relatively large numbers in the capital, in contrast to other provinces (Small Arms Survey, 2007). This is not surprising, given that Burundians who have steady, formal employment or are relatively wealthy invariably live in Bujumbura, and those people tend to possess firearms such as handguns to defend against armed robbery. It should be noted that there are a large number of guards and watchmen in Bujumbura, though those employed by security agencies are not armed.65

6.2 Women’s security concerns

Women’s views on security. While in general women as well as men and youth live in fear of armed violence and banditry, research by International Alert showed that women have a more negative view of their own security situation, versus that of society in general. Although by June 2009 most women respondents (68%) considered security in general to have improved – which is to be expected given the end of military fighting – just over half of them (50.3%) believed that security for women themselves remained “poor” or “very poor” (Sebudandi, 2009).

International Alert also found that for women, security concerns inside the home are as important as those outside the home (see Box 6.3). Thirty percent of women have experienced physical violence at home, and nearly as many women, psychological violence. Those figures however are widely considered underestimations, given the reluctance of women to

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64 The city of Bujumbura is in itself a province (Bujumbura Mairie or ‘Bujumbura Municipality’). The surrounding province is called Bujumbura Rurale, and it was the scene of heavy fighting in the civil war.  
65 Guards belonging to security agencies are used in businesses, by expatriates and by many of the relatively wealthy. Other Burundians who cannot afford the cost of a security agency guard employ private individuals, who could potentially be armed. Most expatriates are obligated to hire security agency guards by their employers, be it international NGOs, donor agencies or the UN.  
66 In this major research project, ‘human security’ or ‘security’ in general is used in the sense of protection from armed violence or the threat of armed violence (see Chapter 1). However in this section, a discussion of women’s views necessarily has to focus on all factors they consider important to their security – including, but not only, armed violence.
Taking Risks With Peace in Burundi

acknowledge the abuse (Sebudandi, 2009; Forbes, 2007). For the OECD DAC, findings such as these emphasize the need to have meaningful participation by women in the design and implementation of any security-related project that respects the concept of local ownership and takes context as the starting point (OECD, 2007c).

**Small arms and sexual violence.** Sexual violence during Burundi’s civil war was typical of the Great Lakes region. Rape of women and girls at gunpoint was committed in epidemic proportions by all parties to the conflict. Research shows that rape continues unabated in the post-conflict period. Similar to other countries in the region, when women and girls are found alone at home during an armed robbery, they are nearly always raped as well as robbed (Rackley, 2005). International Alert research in 2009 found that 13% of women surveyed reported being raped, and doctors at the MSF-Belgium health centre in Bujumbura estimated that 15% of rapes were carried out at gunpoint (Sebudandi, 2009). However those figures are also considered to represent just the tip of the iceberg, because if in Burundi “rape is evidently not taboo, talking about it certainly is,” as Rackley notes. GRIP research showed that in every province surveyed, counsellors emphasized that the number of women and girls raped at gunpoint but whose cases remained unregistered (and untreated) far surpassed those registered. Women did not generally admit to being raped, because the victim was usually blamed for it. Silence was preferable, since rape-related social stigma, lasting a lifetime, was considered worse than the rape itself. In rural communities of Ruyigi province for example, women reported that rape using homemade mugobore was commonplace, and the perpetrators were not soldiers or ex-combatants but local neighbours. The rapists were known, but women did not dare denounce them (Rackley, 2005).

**Widowhood.** As previously noted, most victims of armed violence are men; however the indirect impact on their female partners can also be devastating. For example, the loss of a husband to armed violence, during the civil war or in the post-conflict period, can have catastrophic consequences for a woman because under Burundian law, women cannot inherit property, or own land. Since 90% of Burundians work in agriculture, most women in the country

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**Box 6.3**

**Major types and frequency of violent acts experienced by women respondents**

- Physical violence outside the home: 30%.
- Physical violence inside the home: 29.5%.
- Verbal abuse inside the home: 25.3%.
- Rape outside the home: 14%.
are in essence rural workers without rights to the land or to the harvests (Sebudandi, 2009). If her husband is killed, the direct consequence is that her belongings and property are returned to the late husband’s family.

In a context of extreme poverty, large families, and weakened social cohesion, with the added factor of tens of thousands of refugees being repatriated from camps in Tanzania, disputes over land ownership are a primary source of violence in the country. It is therefore no surprise that a widow is often rejected and banished by her late husband’s family. Women who with their children are chased off the land more often than not will turn to prostitution to survive. According to GRIP, prostitution was “rife” in rural communities. GRIP research found that prostitution, in
addition to providing some income, also improved the personal security of a widowed woman, because the lack of bonds with local men left her vulnerable to rape. Prostitution was viewed as safer than being alone, exposed to violence (Rackley, 2005). The fate of widows is an example of the devastating social and economic impact of armed violence in Burundi.

6.3 Lending and renting small arms

The practice of lending and/or renting small arms to bandits also fuels armed violence in Burundi. GRIP research in late 2004 gathered “innumerable” accounts of weapons being sold, loaned or rented out by soldiers and civil servants to bandits and others whose intent was material gain through armed violence. Indeed, firearm ownership was lucrative because of the possibility of renting out the firearm. After an armed attack, the assailant and owner of the weapons reportedly shared the stolen goods and cash, or, the owner was paid a rental fee, which at the time was approximately $ 50 – a considerable sum for Burundi (Rackley, 2005).

The renting or leasing weapons in Burundi does not only take place in national territory. Research by the Small Arms Survey demonstrated how arms trafficking could cross international borders like that of the Burundi-DRC, thus underlining the need for a regional approach to small arms control. The UN Security Council noted in 2005 that Burundian soldiers sold their weapons in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Pézard and Florquin, 2007). Burundian rebels were also present in the DRC, where they established rear bases during the war (Ntibarikure, 2006). It was relatively easy for them to purchase or lease SALW for cash, particularly from armed Congolese armed groups. Weapons could also be traded for food and goods such as stolen cows (Pézard and Florquin, 2007). According to the Burundian police, efforts to strengthen border controls, as well as link with regional police forces are ongoing (PNB, 2009).

Research carried out by Dan Church Aid in August 2007 showed that the practice of renting or leasing of weapons was still ongoing. There was a widespread presumption that the police, and to a lesser extent, the army, was lending out weapons to criminals on a profit-sharing basis (Forbes, 2007).

67 See Chapter 4 for a discussion on the government’s distribution of weapons to civil servants, youth militias, and other civilians during the civil war.
6.4 Public views on civilian disarmament

No development of a ‘gun-owning culture.’ The research studies note that a “gun-owning culture” has not developed in Burundi in the wake of the civil war, nor was one present before the conflict. Research by Dan Church Aid and the Small Arms Survey, for example, noted the absence of cultural factors pushing small arms demand (Dan Church Aid, 2007; Small Arms Survey 2007). In addition, hunting, and shooting as a sport are unknown in Burundi (Small Arms Survey, 2009), nevertheless, as discussed in the next chapter, national SALW legislation included provisions on hunting and shooting as a sport.

Civilians favour civilian disarmament. The research studies also concurred in that civilians have a negative perception of SALW and are in favour of civilian disarmament, which according to the researchers, is to be expected given the pervasive fear that people live with due to armed violence. Already in late 2004, while fighting between the army and FNL continued, GRIP found that both men and women were keenly aware of the negative impact of small arms on civilians. Women additionally feared having small arms in their homes, while men tended to view them as essential for self-defence and home protection (Rackley, 2005).

Women’s fear of having weapons in their homes is well founded. The research reports note the frequency of accidents involving small arms in the home, affecting children as well as adults. In general neither grenades nor firearms are kept under lock, and firearms are rarely kept unloaded. Researchers found that grenades were often in such unsafe conditions that, for extra safety, release handles were held down by tape. Demobilized combatants were reportedly astounded by the unsafe weapons storage conditions they had observed in civilian homes (Small Arms Survey, 2009; Forbes, 2007; Small Arms Survey, 2007).

By late 2007, Dan Church Aid found a population strongly in favour of civilian disarmament, regardless of gender. In the rural and semi-urban areas where the research was carried out, 80% of men and women believed that keeping weapons at home was dangerous (Forbes, 2007). Similarly, research by the Small Arms Survey found that more than two-thirds of respondents believed that weapons were enablers of lethal violence, rather than a source of protection (Small Arms Survey, 2007). In Bujumbura Mairie, a clear majority of respondents also believed that keeping small arms at home was dangerous (58.8%), though the percentage was lower than that in rural and semi-urban areas (Small Arms Survey, 2007).
Research carried out by Dan Church Aid in August 2007 is important because it specifically focused on civilian disarmament from the perspective of Burundian civilians. To close this chapter, additional key points from the Dan Church Aid research are discussed.

Small arms are no longer viewed as useful for self-defence at home. While research participants acknowledged that many civilians had acquired weapons for self-defence during the civil war, most participants no longer saw a reason for keeping them in the post-conflict period. In fact, few people believed that keeping small arms at home would deter armed bandits who entered homes in numbers: bandits in Burundi have developed the practice of demanding, at gunpoint, the surrender of all household weapons as soon as they enter a home. Research participants believed that the justification of self-defence was a pretext for covering up the true motivations, which were for robbery, intimidation, extortion, and other criminal activities, or, in the hope the weapons would be exchanged for money in a future disarmament initiative (Forbes, 2007).

Belief that in the future small arms owners may receive financial incentives to turn in their weapons. The Small Arms Survey report also noted the general belief that at one point, there could be a cash-for-SALW program for civilians. The researchers believed that this was linked to the fact that in late 2005, at least some of the youth militias had been given an incentive of BIF 100,000 (approximately $100) to disarm. This had “excited hope” that the government would follow a similar policy with civilians (Pézard and Florquin, 2007).

Awareness that people turn to armed violence and banditry as a result of poverty and a lack of opportunities. There is awareness that abject poverty and the lack of opportunities drive many people to small arms use and banditry. According to Dan Church Aid, people were aware that demobilized combatants, with no other way of securing their livelihoods, were turning to banditry, and that tackling the root causes of armed violence was necessary. Achievements and failures of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration initiatives have an important impact on civilian disarmament, and the issue is taken up in Chapters 7 and 8.
Taking Risks With Peace in Burundi

**Lack of confidence in the authorities including the police.** Research participants had little confidence in the capacity of the police to protect them from armed violence, and as already noted, it was also presumed that the police, and to a lesser extent the military, were often complicit in criminal activities. Criminals taken in by the police were often quickly released, reinforcing the impression that some people were immune to prosecution (Forbes, 2007). The Small Arms Survey found that people in Bujumbura Mairie, significantly affected by armed violence and crime, were least likely to find the authorities, including the police, effective in dealing with the armed violence problem. In Bujumbura Mairie, only 26% of research participants found the authorities effective in dealing with armed violence. In the interior of the country, the figure was higher; though still less than half, at 44% (Pézard and Florquin, 2007).

**SALW awareness-raising activities are key.** Dan Church Aid found that a majority of people believed that a thorough awareness-raising campaign on the dangers of SALW and on civilian disarmament was central to any future initiative (see Box 6.4). Interpersonal communication was seen as the most effective channel for persuading people to disarm. Members of religious orders, demobilized combatants, and youth and women leaders were potential facilitators, ideally also being from the area in question. Facilitators needed to be trained and equipped in order to engage with the community in dialogue, and according to research participants, they could work as unpaid volunteers, but given some material compensation for their efforts. Radio was considered an essential support to interpersonal communication, but not efficient on its own. Theatre, interestingly, was considered a third possible communication mechanism in rural areas, but less so in Bujumbura, since urban dwellers were more likely to view it as “light entertainment” and take its disarmament messages less seriously than rural dwellers (Forbes, 2007). Particularly in rural areas, posters and brochures were not considered to be of great use because a significant proportion of the population is illiterate, and most people do not interpret written messages or a complicated series of images easily.

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**Box 6.4**

**Components of an awareness-raising campaign**

- Prioritize interpersonal communication methods, supported by radio.
- Target the entire adult population, with special attention to youth and former combatants.
- Rely on local authorities to lead activities in rural areas.
- Train local people as animators, e.g. religious, youth or women leaders, or ex-combatants.
Taking Risks With Peace in Burundi

Research participants believed that the target group should be the entire adult population, since it was not known who possessed SALW and who did not. In addition, special attention needed to be paid to unemployed youth and demobilized combatants. According to Dan Church Aid, the rural population invests a good deal of authority on the local social hierarchy, and would participate in activities led by for example the “chef de zone” (head of the district), and the “chef de secteur” (village chief). The involvement of local authorities was therefore considered important.

_Weapons for Development._ Most research participants also believed that individual incentives were necessary for those who possessed weapons, and for those with relevant information. Community incentives were not considered appropriate since SALW were used to protect individuals and immediate family, not the community in a collective sense. According to participants, though many people hoped to receive cash for weapons, they were also well aware of the risks of restarting a weapons trade, given the ease with which SALW can be obtained in the nearby Democratic Republic of Congo. Nonetheless most research participants agreed that if incentives were well chosen to reflect the value of the weapon, a majority of civilians would disarm.

_Coercive civilian disarmament._ Dan Church Aid found that the negative impact of SALW in society was motivation enough for the majority of the civilian population to disarm. However, most research participants also agreed that a minority of people would resist all attempts at voluntary disarmament, and therefore forced disarmament campaigns would have to be carried out in the future. Voluntary disarmament campaigns had to be backed up by the threat of force once a set amnesty period expired (Foster, 2007).

### 6.5 Recapitulation of armed violence and views towards disarmament

This chapter has reviewed a number of recent research reports that have focused on the impact of armed violence and local views on civilian disarmament in Burundi. It is difficult to exaggerate the economic and social impact of armed violence in the country. Though most perpetrators and victims of armed violence are males, there are different and grave consequences for women and girls as well, some directly linked to the discriminatory legal framework that Burundian women face. Civilians in general live in a climate of fear, and are strongly in favour of civilian disarmament, via the use of individual incentives and eventually forced-disarmament initiatives.
Taking Risks With Peace in Burundi

Research participants were clear on factors that would lead to a successful civilian disarmament initiative, including awareness-raising campaigns. It was also noted that former youth combatants must receive special attention in a disarmament initiative. The next chapter will discuss how these issues were dealt within the civilian disarmament campaign of October 2009.

*Painting of massacred seminarians at the monument in Buta, Bururi (Charlie Avendaño)*
CHAPTER 7
CIVILIAN DISARMAMENT IN BURUNDI

7.1 Introduction
The significant economic and social impacts of SALW and armed violence were discussed in Chapter 6. Clearly, taking small arms and light weapons out of circulation in Burundi will increase the chances of successes in post-conflict reconciliation and development. In this chapter, the attention turns to current actions – the civilian disarmament project implemented by the government with UN support, as well as the actions of other organizations. The civilian disarmament project culminated with the October 2009 disarmament campaign, the project subsequently closing in December 2009; however, in spite of that campaign, a central recommendation of this research project is that there is a need for additional disarmament drives in Burundi at a future date. Three major factors underline this conclusion: the results of the brief October 2009 campaign were modest; too many ex-combatants kept their weapons after demobilization; and, political events during the course of 2010 makes it certain, for most observers, that different factions are retaining SALW.

Interviews were carried out in Bujumbura throughout December 2009, after the disarmament campaign, but before the UN had finalized its tally of weapons handed in and development tools handed out. Interviews were carried out with government officials, UN staff, with donors that only provided funding, donors that provided funding and also implemented projects, with technical and research-oriented NGOs, with NGOs whose work is not centred on security issues, and with individual researcher consultants. As noted in the methodology section of Chapter 1, in most cases, individuals requested anonymity, which is not surprising given the sensitive nature of the work. Sources therefore are not named beyond the appellation of ‘donor’ or ‘NGO representative.’

7.2 United Nations civilian disarmament project
The UN Peacebuilding Fund. The UN Peacebuilding Commission was established through Security Council Resolution 1645 on 20 December 2005, with a mandate to support peacebuilding in countries such as Burundi, emerging from armed conflict. In October 2006, the...
the UN Peacebuilding Fund was established in order to provide financial resources to the Peacebuilding Commission. The purpose of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is to permit the Peacebuilding Commission to tackle immediate peacebuilding needs in post-conflict countries before other funding mechanisms are in place – it is meant to have a catalytic effect in the short-term, help to kick-start post-conflict recovery and development in the long-term (Specker and Brisco, 2010; Iro, 2009). The total portfolio of the PBF (pledges, plus commitments, plus interest) up to February 2010 was approximately $ 348 million, of which slightly over $ 196 million had been allocated.  

From the beginning, Burundi has been a focus of attention for the Peacebuilding Commission. In June 2006, along with Sierra Leone, Burundi was selected as one of the first two “focus countries” for the work of the Commission. In spite of the difficult relations that prevailed between the UN and the Nkurunziza government at the time, 

UN peacebuilding efforts in Burundi advanced relatively quickly.

- In October 2006, a new UN mission, the Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi (BINUB) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1645. On 1 January 2007, BINUB became active.
- In November 2006, a new Executive Representative of the Secretary-General, the veteran UN high-ranking representative Youssef Mahmoud, arrived in Bujumbura.
- On 29 January 2007, at the 8th Summit of African Nations held in Addis Ababa, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon formally announced a PBF allocation of $ 35 million to Burundi, and an equal allocation to Sierra Leone. As of December 2009, most of the funds for Burundi ($ 34.6 million) had been committed to projects.
- In February 2007, the UN in partnership with the Government of Burundi issued the Burundi PBF Priority Plan – with four priority areas, one of which was “Strengthening the Rule of Law and the Security Sector,” including civilian disarmament.  

(c)to provide information and improve coordination, develop best practices, and ensure predictable financing for early recovery. See http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/index.shtml

69 See http://www.unpbf.org/index.shtml
70 See Chapter 1; and Action Aid et al. (2007). “Consolidating the Peace? Views from Sierra Leone and Burundi on the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Action Aid: London.
71 See http://www.unpbf.org/burundi/burundi.shtml
72 The three other priority areas are (a) governance issues; (b) strengthening the rule of law and the protection of human rights; and (c) property and land issues. See ‘Plan prioritaire pour la consolidation de la paix au Burundi: note stratégique 1, février 2007’ at http://www.unpbf.org/burundi/burundi.shtml
PBF funding for civilian disarmament and the security sector in Burundi. From the PBF funds made available for peacebuilding in Burundi, civilian disarmament was one of the first priorities. In late March 2007, $ 500,000 was allocated to the civilian disarmament project under the ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law and the Security Sector’ priority area: Lancement des activités de désarmement de la population et de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre [Launch of civilian disarmament, and activities to counter the proliferation of SALW].

Over the following months, four security sector-related projects in that priority area were allocated funding as well. Overall, a significant 37.46% ($ 13.1 million of the total $ 35 million) UN PBF funding for Burundi was dedicated to security-related projects, however of that $ 13.1 million, less than 4% was dedicated to civilian disarmament. Most of the funding was allocated to support for reform of the police and for the barracking of army personnel (see Table 7.1).
Table 7.1
PBF funding allocations to civilian disarmament and the security sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Burundi PBF Steering Committee Approval</th>
<th>Amount (US $)</th>
<th>% of funding for security sector (US $ 13,112 M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian disarmament</td>
<td>29 March 2007</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>3.81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Security sector related:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Approval</th>
<th>Amount (US $)</th>
<th>% of funding for security sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barracking of army personnel</td>
<td>5 April 2007</td>
<td>4,583,000</td>
<td>34.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights training for the intelligence service</td>
<td>27 June 2007</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>3.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for reform of the police</td>
<td>5 July 2007</td>
<td>6,900,000</td>
<td>52.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of army discipline and proper relations with civilians</td>
<td>26 October 2007</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>3.06%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Project extensions and budget increases:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Approval</th>
<th>Amount (US $)</th>
<th>% of funding for security sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barracking of army personnel</td>
<td>24 November 2008</td>
<td>229,150</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 13,112,150 100%

Project implementation. In April 2006, just months after its election victory, the Nkurunziza government had set up the national authority for civilian disarmament, the “Commission technique de désarmement de la population civile” (CTDC). Its members were appointed in August 2006, half a year prior to the approval of the PBF project on civilian disarmament in April 2007 (see Table 7.2 for project timeline, goals, outputs and other details). The February 2007 Burundi PBF Priority Plan had indicated that the civilian disarmament campaign would take place “a bit later on in 2007,” but prospects for speedy progress subsided quickly. In the end, the national disarmament campaign was implemented over 10 days in late October 2009, more than three years after the national authority was created, and two and a half years after the approval of the PBF project. The project itself was completed 18 months late.

73 See www.unpbf.org/burundi/burundi-projects.shtml
Table 7.2
Civilian disarmament project information (March 2007)\textsuperscript{74}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Location:</strong></th>
<th>All Burundian provinces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project cost:</strong></td>
<td>US $ 500 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time period:</strong></td>
<td>01 July 2007 – 30 June 2008 (12 months)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**A two-step process:**
- An awareness campaign promoting civilian disarmament
- SALW collection drives

**Global goal:**
Improve the population’s security through civilian disarmament pilot activities, and by the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence

**Immediate objective:**
Support the implementation of a civilian disarmament strategy and counter the proliferation of SALW, contributing to a culture of peace and non-violence

**Expected outputs:**
- A better understanding of the proliferation of small arms and their impact on peace prospects
- A SALW collection strategy approved and implemented
- The profile and capacities of the CTDC are improved

**Key activities:**
- Put in place provincial and local disarmament commissions
- Organize thematic (awareness and sensitization) days
- Organize media campaigns
- Put in place a network (not specified) against SALW
- Begin weapons collection

The lack of capacity – managerial and technical – at the CTDC was the main reason for the delay in project implementation. According to donor officials interviewed, the new CNDD

\textsuperscript{74} Personal (non-official) translation from the French.
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government had appointed commission members based on political criteria and not according to knowledge of, or experience with, SALW issues including civilian disarmament.\textsuperscript{75} As a result of inactivity, by December 2007, the UN was reporting a five-month delay,\textsuperscript{76} and in April 2008, the government announced its intention to restructure the CTDC. It took almost a year for the commission to be restructured – only in March 2009 did the UN report that the new ‘Commission nationale du désarmement civil et de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petits calibres’ (CDCPA) was up and running. An independent researcher consultant on security issues noted that the Commission was on its third president since mid-2007, and emphasized the importance for the future of a national authority that was stable and had adequate institutional capacity.\textsuperscript{77}

Some small-scale activities had been carried out before the CDCPA was in place however. In 2007 one-time awareness-raising workshops were held for civil society organizations, and for journalists. At the workshop with civil society organizations, a network was created, but this network would not be active thereafter and was not taken into account by the government in any decision-making.\textsuperscript{78} In 2008, BINUB produced a communication strategy for the coming campaign, and contracts with advertising agencies were made. In total, 18 meetings between BINUB and government staff were organized to work out the future awareness campaign. A five-day experts workshop for the elaboration of a project of law was organized, as well as a workshop for high-level government officials, on the Nairobi Protocol regulating SALW in East Africa. Though these activities were carried out in 2007 and 2008, the perception of those in the NGO community not working on the civilian disarmament file, and of the public in general, was that there had been very little progress: there had been no awareness campaign, and no disarmament drives had taken place since news of the CTDC and of the PBF project had received wide media coverage in 2006 and 2007, respectively.\textsuperscript{79}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[75] Separate interviews with representatives of two donor agencies, Bujumbura, December 2009.
\item[76] Progress updates on the civilian disarmament project are available at www.unpbf.org/burundi/burundi-projects.shtml
\item[77] Interview with independent research consultant for international organizations, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.
\item[78] Interview with the program manager of an international NGO working on security-related issues, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.
\item[79] Interview with the program manager of a national NGO working on security-related issues, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.
\end{footnotes}
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The slow pace of progress had consequences in terms of public opinion, but also for UN staffing. Unsurprisingly, after months of little activity, the staff member working on SALW and civilian disarmament left the mission. As a result, when progress was made in 2009, including the promulgation of new national legislation on SALW, the UN itself was left scrambling for technical capacity. When the need to quickly implement a national disarmament campaign arose in August 2009, a UN expert on disarmament drives was brought in from the UN MONUC mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The pace of project implementation picked up once the CDCPA became active. According to BINUB, the CDCPA began limited collection of weapons under the “Arms for Development” campaign from March to September 2009, in six provinces including Bujumbura-Mairie and Bujumbura-Rurale. Results were limited however: 210 weapons recovered in those provinces in June 2009. There was more progress in the promulgation of national legislation regulating small arms and light weapons.

National Legislation. In what was considered by many observers to be a relatively quick process, a project of law on SALW was approved by a ministerial council in early May 2009, and introduced in parliament in July 2009. President Nkurunziza signed the law in less than 30 days, and on 28 August 2009, national legislation, Loi 1/14 Portant régime des armes légères et de petits calibres, came into effect. Law 1/14 set the calendar for the civilian disarmament campaign, because it specified a two-month amnesty period, effective until 28 October 2009, for civilians possessing small arms and light weapons to turn them in without the threat of prosecution. After that date, the possession of SALW is prohibited for civilians in Burundi, except for those with authorization to possess weapons for personal security reasons (Article 3). As a result, the civilian disarmament campaign was set for a ten-day period as late as possible in the given timeframe – from 19 to 28 October 2009.

7.3 The “Arms for Development” civilian disarmament campaign of October 2009

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80 Interview with BINUB staff responsible for civilian disarmament, Bujumbura, December 2009.
81 On 1 July 2010, through Security Council Resolution 1925, MONUC became ‘MONUSCO.’
82 The objective of Law 1/14 is specified in its first article: to prevent, combat and eradicate the manufacture, trafficking, possession and use of illicit SALW. The law has 64 articles. It is available (in French) at http://www.bibliomines.org/recherche/document/item/doc/burundi-loi-portant-regime-des-armes-legeres-et-de-petits-calibres/
The methodology used for the 19-28 October 2009 “Arms for Development” civilian disarmament campaign included:\textsuperscript{83}

- Distribution of 10,000 pamphlets on the civilian disarmament campaign, and on the safe handling of SALW.
- Renting large advertising signs for civilian disarmament and SALW control messages in six strategic street corners of the capital, Bujumbura.
- Door-to-door visits carried out over 5 days (19-23 October 2009), by 120 facilitators [sensibilisateurs] in each of Burundi’s 17 provinces; a total of 2,040 facilitators nation-wide.
- A media event held to launch the campaign.
- The involvement of 138 police stations throughout the country, for the collection of SALW during the campaign.
- Distribution of 2,500 t-shirts with awareness messages.
- Messages regarding the campaign and the danger of SALW possession transmitted via 12 radio stations and 3 television stations.

\textit{Demobilization: CNDD-FDD rebels handing over mortars, Mabanda, Makamba Province, February 2005 (UN photo)}

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\textsuperscript{83} See the BINUB progress update of December 2009 available at www.unpbf.org/burundi/burundi-projects.shtml
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The results from the October 2009 campaign are relatively modest, given that the project was based on the late-2005 estimate of at least one SALW present in approximately 100,000 households country-wide, a figure produced by Small Arms Survey and Ligue Iteka research (and commissioned by UNDP for the civilian disarmament campaign) (Pézard and Florquin, 2007). As noted in Chapter 5, between late 2005 and October 2009, relatively few small arms and light weapons held by civilians had been seized in police sweeps, or voluntarily turned in.

From the perspective of the civilian population, many months of small-scale activities that went unnoticed by most of the people were followed by a quick 10-day nation-wide awareness and civilian disarmament campaign. There was no awareness campaign regarding Law 1/14, and the law had not yet been translated into Kirundi when the campaign ran. As a result, the general population was not well informed. The UN and donors had called for a six-month amnesty and awareness period, and there was dismay in the international community when the government announced that it would set the amnesty period at only two months. Concretely for BINUB, that meant there were approximately six weeks to organize, from scratch, a 10-day nation-wide awareness and disarmament campaign – quite a challenge given the limitations set by Burundian roads, communication networks, and other infrastructure shortcomings. From the perspective of BINUB and CDCPA, time was in short supply.

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84 Research results were published in August 2007, but were mainly based on surveys carried out in November and December 2005 (See Chapter 6).
85 Interview with independent research consultant for international organizations, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009. Kirundi is the national language and most of the rural population in the interior only understand Kirundi.
86 The need to buy prepaid phone cards for police chiefs in stations in the interior indicates the challenges faced. Without the phone cards, the police would simply not have been able to make daily calls to Bujumbura, to report on progress during the campaign.
87 Separate interviews with BINUB staff responsible for civilian disarmament, and with the staff member working on the security file for a donor agency, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.
Criticisms were made regarding the timing of the legislation and the disarmament campaign, coming only six months before crucial national elections, and in an increasingly tense political atmosphere.\textsuperscript{88} There was widespread belief that a civilian disarmament campaign was unlikely to have good results in that environment.\textsuperscript{89} Moreover, in a society where rumour and unconfirmed hearsay abound and often have an impact, there was also widespread belief that the Nkurunziza government had purposefully timed the legislation and campaign according to its internal agenda. In this scenario, after the amnesty period for voluntary handover of SALW had ended, the government could carry out sweeps for weapons that targeted opposition groups, basing itself on the new law. Its own CNDD cadres would not be subject to the sweeps. For some observers, it was also likely that the government, sensitive to the criticism coming from media and national and international organizations at the lack of progress, decided it had to show it had done “something” on SALW prior to the elections.\textsuperscript{90}

7.4 Mines Advisory Group: destruction of civilian-held SALW

The UK-based non-governmental humanitarian organization, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), plays an important role in small arms and light weapons control, and civilian disarmament in Burundi.\textsuperscript{91} Present in the country since 2007, MAG works with the Police Nationale du Burundi (PNB) in two areas:

- Reduce the threat posed by unsecure stocks of small arms and light weapons in police station armories through a Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) project.
- Support civilian disarmament in Burundi by collecting and destroying SALW handed over to the PNB and CDCPA.

Before the PSSM project, police station armories in all of the country’s provinces were considered insecure and unsafe. Police weapons were vulnerable to theft, or to being leased or sold out by police members. In addition, SALW collected through sweeps or voluntary

\textsuperscript{88} Nation-wide democratic elections, the first after the historic 2005 elections that brought the CNDD former rebels into power, and the first in which the former FNL rebels would participate, were held in mid-2010: communal elections on 24 May, the presidential election on 28 June, and parliamentary elections on 23 July 2010.

\textsuperscript{89} Interview with staff member working on the security file for a donor agency, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.

\textsuperscript{90} Separate interviews with staff member working on the security file for a donor agency, and an independent research consultant for international organizations, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.

\textsuperscript{91} See http://www.maginternational.org/burundi/
handovers were left in police stations with no security precautions, thus having the same risks of theft or trafficking as police stocks (See Chapter 6).

In July 2008, a joint MAG-PNB mobile team was created for the collection and destruction of SALW and unexploded ordnance. Eight PNB officers were seconded to MAG for training in the identification, transport and destruction of SALW. MAG issues monthly updates of its work in Burundi; in March 2009 for example, it reported that between August 2008 and March 2009, the joint mobile team had collected some 2,500 weapons and 65,000 items of ammunition.\textsuperscript{92} Between 2 February and 6 March 2009, the MAG-PNB teams destroyed over 3,000 grenades. Also in 2009, surplus SALW from police stocks that were not obsolete were destroyed. It was the first time that surplus police stocks had been destroyed in the country.\textsuperscript{93}

MAG supported the October 2009 civilian disarmament campaign. Prior to the start of the campaign, MAG staff organized a one-day training session, for chiefs of police stations, on how to distinguish extremely dangerous ammunition and how to deal with weapons before experts arrived to collect and destroy them. In November 2009, MAG was contracted by UNDP to collect and destroy the small arms and light weapons handed over to the CDCPA and PNB during the October 2009 civilian disarmament campaign, and this work went on for the next few months. Results for the period November 2009 to February 2010 are listed in Table 7.4.

\textsuperscript{92} See http://www.maginternational.org/MAG/en/reports/reports/publications/burundi-monthly-reports/

\textsuperscript{93} Interview with Country Program Manager, Mines Advisory Group, Bujumbura, December 2009.
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Table 7.4
MAG-PNB collection and destruction of SALW from the October 2009 civilian disarmament campaign

*SALW collected during the October 2009 civilian disarmament campaign in Bujumbura police stations and destroyed in November 2009*

- 559 weapons
- 1,034 grenades
- 40,602 items of ammunition

*SALW collected in five provinces during the civilian disarmament campaign and destroyed in December 2009 and January 2010*

- 483 weapons
- 2,741 rifle magazines
- 2,218 grenades
- 13,693 items of small arms ammunition

MAG will continue to support improvements to the safety and security of police armouries. It is also going to initiate a multi-year project with the Burundian army, along similar lines to the PSSM project with the PNB. A nation-wide diagnostic of FDN armouries was to be carried out in the first half of 2010.94

7.5 Security sector efforts to date

The creation of new security organizations in Burundi is a key feature of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of August 2000. A new army – the Force de défense nationale (FDN); a new police force – the Police Nationale du Burundi (PNB); and a new investigations service – the Service National de Renseignement (SNR), were created. There is to be an ethnic balance between Hutu and Tutsi (50-50), and members of the former army (Forces armées burundaises, FAB) and rebel groups, may be integrated into the new army and police forces (Powell, 2007).

94 Interview with Country Program Manager, Mines Advisory Group, Bujumbura, December 2009.
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If a spectrum can be visualized between development of the security sector at one end, and reform of the security sector at the other, then according to observers, security-related initiatives in post-conflict Burundi, to date, are necessarily closer to the development rather than the reform end.\footnote{The 2007 OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform noted that since the SSR concept had been embraced by the international community, a tendency had developed to label any security sector-related initiative as security sector ‘reform,’ regardless of whether actual reform was involved or not (OECD, 2007a).} Thus, as noted earlier in the chapter, 35% of PBF security-related funding was dedicated to barracking army personnel – a developmental priority, given the lack of facilities, and the need to get army personnel away from populated centres.\footnote{Interview with BINUB staff responsible for security sector work, Bujumbura, December 2009.} Another example is the creation of the PNB in the post-conflict period. Respondents emphasized that since 2006, the new police force has practically been built from scratch.\footnote{Separate Interviews with a staff member working on the security file for a donor agency, and MAG Country Program Manager, Bujumbura, December 2009.} Prior to 2006, the former police force had been inactive for several years, and the Burundian gendarmerie had no knowledge or experience with community policing.\footnote{Interview with Country Program Manager, MAG, Bujumbura, December 2009.} In the period 2006 to 2009 therefore, infrastructural shortcomings were a priority: the PNB received Belgian support for the construction of a training centre in Muramvya, for example; French cooperation funds were used to construct the new national police academy in Mitakataka, Bubanza; the Dutch government provided trucks and pickup vans so that transportation needs could be met; UNIFEM provided motorcycles and computers to the police in the west of the country; and the Belgian NGO RCN Justice & Démocratie provided photocopiers, fax machines and other office equipment (PNB, 2009).

Security sector development will continue into the future in Burundi, so there will be opportunities for security sector activities and civilian disarmament drives to be carried out in a complementary and mutually-reinforcing manner (see Chapter 2). Both Belgium and The Netherlands are committed to support the development of the security sector in Burundi. The Dutch have made a long-term, eight-year commitment. Activities and funding will be determined every two years; activities will include both development and reform-type activities, as indicated in Table 7.5. For its part, Belgium will continue to support the development of the PNB through a five-year project.\footnote{Separate interviews with, and documents provided by, program officers responsible for the security sector file, Embassies of Belgium and The Netherlands, Bujumbura, December 2010.}
Table 7.5
Initial programming related to the Armed Forces (FDN), 2009-2010, Netherlands-Burundi security sector development project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activity 1</td>
<td>Secondment of a Dutch expert to the Directorate of Planning and Strategic Studies (DGPES) of the FDN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 2</td>
<td>Creation of a fund to be used for training purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 3</td>
<td>Renovation of 7 army barracks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 4</td>
<td>Provision of 18 trucks for the transport of construction materials and fuel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 5</td>
<td>Provision of 296 ovens for use in army barracks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 6</td>
<td>Reinforcement of military ethics (democratic control, gender equality, leadership, discipline, human rights, and protection of the vulnerable).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 7</td>
<td>A joint military engineers mission to determine priority infrastructural needs of the army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 8</td>
<td>A study on information and communication needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 9</td>
<td>Support to army engineers with carpentry and metallurgical equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 10</td>
<td>A three-year management course for general-level army officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 11</td>
<td>Strategic Planning course for mid-level officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 12</td>
<td>Support for financial planning capacities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 13</td>
<td>Support to the naval forces on border control in Lake Tanganyika</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.6 DDR efforts to date
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants in Burundi was first managed through the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP).\textsuperscript{100} The program, involving numerous agencies and managed by the World Bank, operated in seven

\textsuperscript{100} See http://www.mdrp.org
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countries of the Great Lakes Region of Africa from 2002 until 2009.\(^{101}\) It had a global budget of approximately $450 million, and in total, approximately 300,000 combatants were demobilized.

In Burundi, from March 2004 until December 2008, approximately 26,000 adults were demobilized through the MDRP program, all of them receiving reinsertion support (Duma and Gasana, 2008).\(^{102}\) In addition, approximately 19,000 militias, *Gardiens de la paix* and *Militants combattants* (see Chapter 4), received a one-time reinsertion payment. Some 22,000 beneficiaries, in addition to reinsertion support, also received reintegration support.\(^{103}\) There were over 3,000 child combatants demobilized, most of whom received both reinsertion and

\(^{101}\) The seven countries were Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda.

\(^{102}\) Reinsertion is the transitional assistance to help former combatants with their immediate needs after being demobilized, such as food, clothes, shelter, medical services, and short-term training or employment.

\(^{103}\) Reintegration is assistance meant to help former combatants and their families re-enter civilian life in the longer term, through social integration into their communities and through employment. The goal is to help former combatants establish sustainable livelihoods.
reintegration support. Following the closure of the MDRP program in Burundi in December 2008, a single-country fund was set up to deal with the demobilization of FNL fighters. The timeline of the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) is from March 2009 until December 2011 (Specker and Briscoe, 2010).

From the perspective of civilian disarmament and SALW control, DDR initiatives in Burundi have had mixed results to date. According to independent reviews of the DDR experience, as well as media reports, three worrying developments stand out:

(i) Significant numbers of ex-combatants did not surrender their weapons when demobilizing.

(ii) A large proportion of ex-combatants that received reintegration support promptly consumed, or traded in, their individual benefit packages, and consequently, found themselves in conditions of abject poverty.

(iii) Many ex-combatants, particularly former youth militia members, were excluded from the DDR process, and for the most part retained their weapons as well.

During the disarmament and demobilization of FNL combatants, media reports emphasized the fact that relatively few weapons had been turned in. In July 2008, for example, 2,450 FNL combatants had assembled for demobilization in Rugazi, Bubanza province, but only 40 weapons had been handed in. The governmental commission in charge of DDR (CNDRR) also emphasized the lack of success with the reintegration of ex-combatants, and the fact that many had retained their weapons. In July 2008, it noted that numerous ex-combatants, both from government and rebel forces, were participating in acts of armed banditry. For most ex-combatants, reintegration had proven to be difficult. Almost a year later, in late April 2009, the government expressed alarm that only 722 small arms and light weapons had been turned in by over 8,500 demobilized FNL fighters.

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In October 2008, the governmental Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael” commissioned an independent evaluation of the DDR experience to date, as part of Dutch involvement in security sector development in Burundi. According to the evaluation, reintegration of ex-combatants in urban areas largely failed because they lacked basic skills for reintegrating; many were also illiterate. Needing funds to restart their lives, build homes, or perhaps to support family members returning from exile in Tanzania, most ex-combatants sold back their benefit packages to the very businessmen from whom the goods had been purchased by the reintegration program. Those who did manage to set up a business were unable to compete with established small traders because they lacked access to wholesale traders and credit (Douma and Gasana, 2008).

These findings parallel those of the Dan Church Aid 2007 research report: after the funds dried up, or their business ventures failed, many ex-combatants turned to crime in order to survive (Forbes, 2007). Reintegration was slightly more successful in rural areas, if the ex-combatant was returning to his former family land. If the ex-combatant had lost his land and property, he was starting from scratch and did not fare any better than his urban counterparts (Douma and Gasana, 2008). The authors recommended that future reintegration actions be based on a
thorough analysis of the socio-economic context; that specific target groups within the
demobilizing fighters be profiled; and, that a realistic risk analysis should identify specific
geographic areas and be used to identify priority groups in those areas. In this way, a map of
economic opportunities for specific target groups in geographical areas could be produced,
leading to more fine-tuned interventions in the future (Douma and Gasana, 2008).

The presence of former youth militia who either formally or informally participated in the fighting
but were subsequently excluded from the DDR process, is worrying. Already in mid-2007
research by Dan Church Aid had noted that while some youth militia had been demobilized and
received reinsertion support, many others had been excluded. These former youth militia were
selling their skills as hired guns, and Dan Church Aid research found that hiring someone to do
“the dirty work” was an option for settling disputes in every urban area in the four provinces
visited (Forbes, 2007). In 2010, the issue was still relevant: a Dutch study on economic recovery
in Burundi found that those youth who had self-demobilized, or had been excluded from the
DDR process, were resentful and bitter about those ex-combatants who had been “officially”
reintegrated. Youth had been kept away from the DDR program and shunned by their
communities, being perceived as opportunists, thieves or “hatchet men” doing dirty jobs for
politicians (Specker and Brisco, 2010).

Adding to the problem of youth militia marginalized from the DDR process is the large number of
FNL-linked individuals who are not included in the DDR program that was initiated in 2009. At
first the FNL had put forth the figure of 21,000 combatants eligible for reintegration support, but
the government and the international community considered this figure to be an exaggeration of
the number of FNL combatants. Given the pervasive poverty that a majority of people in Burundi
lives in, significant numbers of people had joined the FNL since the September 2006 ceasefire,
in anticipation of benefits down the road. In addition to those people, other Burundians much
better off had also tried to abuse the process: a human rights NGO reported that some civil
servants for example were paying BIF 200,000-300,000 ($ 160-240) to be enrolled in FNL lists,
in anticipation of benefiting from DDR money.108

In April 2009, the FNL decided on the following figures, which were accepted:

- 3,500 FNL combatants to be integrated into the armed forces and the police.
- 5,000 FNL combatants to be demobilized and go through the reintegration process.
- 10,000 FNL associates who were neither integrated, nor eligible for the reintegration process, and essentially told to go home.\(^{109}\)

It is not known how many of the FNL associates that were not part of any DDR process retained weapons. What is known is that those individuals are bitter and resentful not only at the FNL leadership, which they feel has abandoned them, but also at the international community and its representatives in Bujumbura, and of course the CNDD government. As one observer pointed out, many might have not been combatants, but nevertheless those individuals had left their former lives to join the FNL.\(^{110}\)

### 7.7 Summary

The security-related Peacebuilding Fund projects in Burundi, including the civilian disarmament project, have been completed. The BINUB mission ended on 31 December 2010 and was immediately replaced on 1 January 2011 by BNUB, the Bureau des Nations Unies au Burundi.\(^{111}\) As intended, the funds served to focus on urgent, immediate peacebuilding priorities in Burundi. The civilian disarmament project, for the most part, consisted of a ten-day awareness and disarmament campaign. The results of that campaign were modest, with 2,186 assault rifles and 12,820 grenades turned in. Given the magnitude of the problem, further civilian disarmament drives are to be expected at a future date. There will be ample opportunity for civilian disarmament to be linked with security sector development. Donors such as Belgium and The Netherlands will continue to support security sector development in Burundi in the coming years.

\(^{109}\) Interview with independent research consultant for international organizations, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.

\(^{110}\) Interview with independent research consultant for international organizations, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.

\(^{111}\) Karin Landgren was appointed to be the Special Representative and Head of BNUB. She had previously been Special Representative at UNMIN in Nepal. The UN presence in the country has been significantly scaled down, with BNUB having 60 civilian staff, as opposed to the 450 staff that at one time worked at BINUB. According to observers, a smaller UN office with a weaker mandate reflected the antagonism of the CNDD government towards the UN. See Agence France-Presse, “UN downsizes Burundi office,” 1 January 2011.
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants have also had modest results. While large numbers of former combatants were demobilized, relatively few weapons were handed in. Research indicates that reintegration was unsuccessful and many former combatants are living in abject poverty. Established good practice based on previous lessons learned was not followed. Lastly, the issues of youth militias and FNL associates will require special attention in the future.
8.1 Civilian disarmament and political developments to September 2010

Future civilian disarmament drives need to be based on realistic appraisals of the political situation in the country. The October 2009 civilian disarmament campaign had modest results, with relatively few weapons handed over during the ten-day period. In addition, many demobilized combatants including former youth militia members and FLN associates are assumed to have retained their weapons. In the lead-up to the mid-2010 round of elections, there were reports that members of the various political factions were going through militia-type exercises, such as weapons instruction and physical training. Work on the development of the new PNB police force, in the first half of 2010, was going to focus almost exclusively on elections-related training, including crowd control and protection of VIPs. The political climate in Burundi in late 2010 is not conducive to civilian disarmament and it is evident that sound analysis of the political situation and its implications for SALW control will have to be carried out before any additional civilian disarmament drives, which are necessary, are considered.

The nation-wide series of elections held in mid-2010 had negative consequences for post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation. Following the 24 May 2010 communal (municipal-level) elections, won by the ruling CNDD party, a coalition of opposition political parties, and the FNL, accused the CNDD government of rigging the elections. Despite the fact that the European Union Election Observer Mission to Burundi insisted that communal elections had largely conformed to international standards, and there had been a 90% voter turnout, the opposition coalition and FNL decided to boycott the presidential and parliamentary elections held in June and July 2010. In Burundi’s second series of elections in the post-war era, and the first that the FNL contested, the CNDD government was re-elected in what was essentially a one-party election, and dialogue between opposing political groups was cut off. After considerable national and international peacebuilding efforts, the 2010 elections resulted in the cessation of political dialogue.

\[112\] Interview with independent research consultant for international organizations, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.
\[113\] Interview with staff member working on the security file for a donor agency, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.
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The hostile environment surrounding the elections, and the opposition boycott, was partly due to the CNDD government’s track record during its 2005-2010 administration. According to an August 2010 Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria) Policy Brief, the CNDD government had failed to govern in the spirit of the power-sharing constitution, more than once resorting to unconstitutional means, threats and intimidation. Opposition groups had seen the elections as an opportunity to re-enter the decision-making process, but when the communal elections went against them, they decided to challenge the legitimacy of the electoral process.\textsuperscript{114}

The security situation also deteriorated during the election months. According to media reports, more than 100 politically-motivated grenade attacks took place in Bujumbura and in the interior during the election period. In June 2010, for example, grenade attacks targeting selected bars in the northern province of Kayanza had seriously injured more than 21 people.\textsuperscript{115}

Regarding security sector development, it was also difficult to find positive news. For example, in September 2010 Amnesty International reported that there was credible evidence that members of the Service national de renseignement (SNR), with the support of the police, had tortured 12 opposition members who had been arrested on suspicion of orchestrating grenade attacks against CNDD members.\textsuperscript{116} This occurred despite the fact that, according to the UN, all SNR personnel (managers, inspectors and agents) had received extensive training in respect of the rule of law under a UN PBF project that had closed in October 2009. In addition, in November 2008, all fourteen members of the Special Parliamentary Commission responsible for oversight of the SNR had also received comprehensive training.\textsuperscript{117} According to the Africa Director of Human Rights Watch, quoted in a 1 July 2010 press release, “clearly ill-intentioned people on both sides of the political divide [were] seeking to exploit recent tensions.”\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{115} IRIN, “Burundi: Veering off the path of peaceful power sharing,” 27 August 2010.
\textsuperscript{117} See project summary and updates for UN PBF Project PBF/BDI/B-3, “Appui pour un service national de renseignement respectueux de l’état de droit,” available at http://www.unpbf.org/burundi/burundi-projects.shtml
A discussion on civilian disarmament in Burundi based on good policy and good practice follows in the next sections of this chapter (see Chapters 2 and 3, and Appendix A). In no sense is the discussion meant to be exhaustive, with only selected key points mentioned.

### 8.2 Good policy

True national ownership of SALW control, including civilian disarmament work, is still some way off. This is because the national authority, the CDCPA, does not have the capacity or expertise that is needed. In keeping with OECD good policy guidelines, the financial and managerial sustainability of the CDCPA are key aspects of institutional capacity building. In Chapter 7, the delays in the implementation of the civilian disarmament campaign were attributed to the lack of capacity and inactivity of the national authority, first the CDTC and subsequently the CDCPA. From the perspective of the government, the timeline of the civilian disarmament project was based more on the timing of the creation of the Peacebuilding Fund and its use as a catalyst in post-conflict contexts, rather than being based on the actual capacity of the national authority in Bujumbura. Respondents noted the difficulty of working with government partners when individuals tend to change positions every two months.\(^\text{119}\) However it is to be expected that the government would experience instability: as one observer noted, the CNDD government is mostly made up of men who had been living a military existence, spending years in the bush.\(^\text{120}\)

With regards to national ownership, another observer noted that the sense of ownership is not fostered when Burundian legal instruments are developed by international consultants, often based on laws in other countries, and then handed over to Burundian authorities for approval.\(^\text{121}\)

Overall, the research revealed that there is little harmonization and coordination of efforts, even though as noted various times, there are relatively few actors in Burundi working on security issues. There is a coordination mechanism – a groupe sectoriel on security issues co-chaired by a donor country and the CDCPA – but donor officials readily recognized that the sectoral group rarely met, and when it did meet it was merely to inform others of their work, not to coordinate efforts.\(^\text{122}\) Another example of the lack of coordination was revealed during interviews: an international organization had commissioned research on a specific security-related issue, only

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\(^{119}\) Interview with staff member working on the security file for a donor agency, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.

\(^{120}\) Interview with staff member working on the security file for a donor agency, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.

\(^{121}\) It was not specified whether this is the case with Law 1/14. However the law does mention in Article 3, the use of weapons for hunting or in sporting activities, though both practices are unknown in the country. Interview with independent research consultant for international organizations, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.

\(^{122}\) Interview with staff member working on the security file for a donor agency, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.
to find out that a donor organization had commissioned a similar study on the same issue. They were unaware of the fact.123 Better harmonization and coordination are going to be important in future activities.

In general, there is a lack of capacity and resources both in national and international organizations. Individuals are overworked, organizations are understaffed, and there’s limited funding. In only one of the interviews carried out did a respondent report that there was a copy of a security-related OECD publication in the office, though the individual had not had time to read it yet.124 None of the individuals interviewed were experts on security matters; individuals were responsible for various files, not just those related to security. The UN mission had staff dedicated to security sector work, but those individuals also reported being overwhelmed with the amount of work,125 and as noted above, the number of UN staff in Burundi was significantly reduced when the BINUB mission ended in December 2010.

Respondents complained about “a culture of meetings” in Bujumbura, and the numbers of work hours that were spent in meetings.126 Another respondent noted that with Burundi being an important post-conflict country for the UN Peacebuilding Commission, and the international community in general, the number of missions, consultations, and requests for feedback, not to mention the paperwork requirements, meant that there were weeks when it was difficult to find time for working on projects.127 Future work on civilian disarmament and security sector development will need to be based on a realistic appraisal of what staff in Bujumbura can accomplish. There is little benefit in staff having workloads that do not permit them to be up to date with donor consensus-making on good practice at the OECD in Paris. Ideally, staff will be experts on the subject matter, a factor that was essential in the success of the EU-ASAC civilian disarmament program in Cambodia (see Chapter 3).

Although there was a national disarmament campaign in October 2009, there is still no national plan on SALW control, that is embedded in national poverty reduction strategies, as called for

123 Separate interviews with staff member working on the security file for a donor agency, and with the program manager of an international NGO working on security-related issues, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.
124 Interview with staff member working on the security file for a donor agency, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.
125 Interview with BINUB staff responsible for security sector work, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.
126 Interview with staff member working on the security file for a donor agency, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.
127 Interview with the program manager of an international NGO working on security-related issues, Bujumbura, Dec. 2009.
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by the OECD DAC (OECD, 2007c; OECD, 2005a). In a clear indication of how rushed the civilian disarmament campaign of October 2009 was, BINUB did report that meetings with the national authority had been held in September 2009 and an outline [ébauche] for a 2009-2013 national plan on SALW control and civilian disarmament was approved, but no further action was taken before the campaign. As of September 2010, there was still no national plan of action. As noted previously there will be additional opportunities in Burundi for civilian disarmament drives, and in particular for linking those drives to the development of the new police and armed forces, however the first step will have to be the development of the national plan on small arms and light weapons with broad and inclusive participation of national civil society groups. A new National Security Council was created in late 2008, and this body along with the CDCPA can lead the work. Unfortunately, to December 2009, this body also mostly existed on paper, having met just once, in February 2009. In addition to the CDCPA, the National Security Council will require capacity-building support.

Traffic on the national highway, Bujumbura Rurale, August 2008 (Charlie Avendaño)

128 See the BINUB progress update of September 2009 available at www.unpbf.org/burundi/burundi-projects.shtml
129 Interview with BINUB staff responsible for civilian disarmament, Bujumbura, December 2009.
130 Email communication from independent consultant, Geneva, September 2010.
131 Interview with BINUB staff responsible for security sector work, Bujumbura, December 2009.
8.3 Good practice requirements

In the previous section, it was noted that future civilian disarmament work would need to be based on a sound analysis of the political situation in the country in the wake of the contentious elections of mid-2010. In addition, a coherent national plan of action will have to be developed. Other comments arise from a review of the case studies presented in Chapter 3.

- A new baseline study

Once the current political impasse is overcome, there is going to be a need for new survey work to arrive at an adequate estimate of the numbers of SALW in circulation in non-state hands. One of the lessons from the Albania and Sierra Leone case studies is the need for adequate baseline data against which to measure progress. One aspect that will require particular attention is the number of weapons that were retained by demobilized combatants and are in circulation in society, and why those weapons were retained.

- Meaningful civil society participation in civilian disarmament work

One key lesson from the El Salvador case study was that a broad-based coalition that included civil society organizations, media, and the private sector had a significant impact in raising awareness of the SALW problem in the country. As noted in all the case studies, a gender and age-sensitive approach is necessary to have broad participation from all members of society. This is key in Burundi, given the fact that many former youth militia will certainly be an important target group. As the case of Sierra Leone showed, unless women are explicitly included, they are likely to be overlooked in disarmament drives. Meaningful participation by civil society organizations in the elaboration of a national strategy or plan for small arms control is a good opportunity to bring all relevant actors to the table.

- A new and longer awareness campaign

A longer awareness campaign will be necessary before a second civilian disarmament drive. As noted in Chapter 7, the UN and others had called for a six-month campaign in Burundi, but the government had decided against it. As the case of Albania showed, an awareness campaign will need to be fine-tuned to the different target groups: the messages for rural populations, for Bujumbura households, or for former youth militia, will, necessarily, have to be different.
• Projects that address the root causes of SALW proliferation

As noted in the case studies, projects should have activities that directly address those root causes, on the basis of sound research. Weapons for Development incentives should, as much as possible, address root causes. One important question for future research in Burundi, for example, is whether the incentives used in October 2009 had a significant impact on convincing people to bring in weapons or not, and whether there were differences between rural and urban populations. Of course, as pointed out in the previous chapter, it is difficult to make that determination given that people may have adopted a “wait and see” attitude to disarming only few months before crucial national-level elections. Extensive consultations and additional knowledge of the situation of civilians and former combatants will be needed for designing appropriate incentive programs.

• Adequate socio-cultural and technical support

As noted in the previous section, by and large, both national and international actors involved in security-related work in Bujumbura are over stretched and understaffed. There’s little awareness of OECD DAC, or donor and NGO expert work, on lessons learned and donor consensus on good practice in the topic. A key lesson from the Sierra Leone case study applies to Burundi as well: if program officers in Bujumbura do not have expertise in the topic, then there needs to be adequate socio-cultural and technical support from head offices or elsewhere.

8.4 Conclusions
1. A ten-day awareness and civilian disarmament campaign in October 2009 resulted in relatively modest number of weapons handed over.
2. The National Commission (CDCPA) lacked technical and managerial capacity, hence national ownership was limited.
3. Prior to the campaign, there was no national SALW action plan in place, and few awareness activities.
4. The timing of the campaign was problematic, coming in an increasingly tense political environment, just months before nation-wide elections.
5. At present, there is relatively little harmonization and coordination of efforts among national and international actors involved in security-related work.

6. There is a lack of capacity and resources, both in national and international organizations.

7. Development of a post-war security sector in Burundi is at the beginning, with a new police, investigations and armed forces created.

8. During demobilization, significant numbers of former combatants retained their weapons in Burundi.

9. Good practice was not followed in the reintegration phase. Not enough resources were available for the reintegration program. For most former combatants reintegration was unsuccessful, with individuals either selling or quickly consuming their benefit packages and left to fend for themselves without support.

8.5 Efforts graded according to good policy and good practice

Efforts to date for civilian disarmament in Burundi are rated on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “non-compliant” and 5 being “fully compliant”, based on the extent to which they adhere to OECD/DAC documented good policy and good practice. The results are presented in Table 8.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good policy</th>
<th>Civilian Disarmament</th>
<th>Police &amp; Service National de Renseignement</th>
<th>Armed Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. National ownership</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Good understanding of local context</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Projects linked to national plans</td>
<td>0/5</td>
<td>3/5</td>
<td>4/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Harmonization among actors</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>2/5</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Gender and age sensitive approach</td>
<td>0/5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sequencing of civilian disarmament with DDR</td>
<td>0/5</td>
<td>0/5</td>
<td>0/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Reintegration from community perspective</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0/5</td>
<td>0/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good practice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Adequate awareness campaigns</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Root causes addressed</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Adequate incentives</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Gender and age-sensitive approach</td>
<td>0/5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Locally-grown broad coalition</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Expert support for project staff</td>
<td>2/5</td>
<td>4/5</td>
<td>4/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Legal SALW stocks secured</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3/5</td>
<td>2/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Weapons handed over in demobilization</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Inclusive DDR</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Adequate reintegration</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% Compliance with good policy/practice</strong></td>
<td><strong>15%</strong></td>
<td><strong>40%</strong></td>
<td><strong>29%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.6 Recommendations

Given documented good practice and policy for civilian disarmament, demobilisation and disarmament, and in order to achieve sustainable peace in Burundi, it is recommended that:

1. Further civilian disarmament campaigns take place in Burundi.
2. Civilian disarmament campaigns be based on a National SALW Plan of Action that is included in the national poverty reduction and development strategy. The development of a national plan is an opportunity to bring all actors to the table including civil society, government, UN and donors.
3. Future activities be based on national ownership. National ownership is linked to a working National Commission (CDCPA) that is financially and managerially sustainable, and meaningful participation by civil society organizations, including women and youth groups.
4. New survey work be done to produce updated baseline data on the number of SALW in circulation.
5. The timing of future civilian disarmament campaigns be based on an analysis of the political situation, due to the 2010 elections and hostile standoff between political parties that have armed groups.
6. Future civilian disarmament campaigns be based on a realistic assessment of local human and financial resources. If necessary, technical and socio-cultural expertise is available from headquarters.
7. Future civilian disarmament be linked to development of the new police, investigation and armed forces, so that they are mutually reinforcing and complementary. An improvement in the security of civilians is key.
8. SALW gathered in future drives should be destroyed in public ceremonies with media and civil society participation.
9. Root causes of conflict be addressed in order to succeed in national reconciliation, and consequently, to have civilian disarmament drives that succeed, and the development of professional security forces.
10. Greater coordination and harmonization be pursued among actors. The Donor-Government Sectoral Group on Security Issues can carry out this function.
11. The Special Parliamentary Commission responsible for oversight of the security forces develop adequate capacity and be able to function independently.
12. Future reintegration projects take into account specific groups, such as former combatants, youth militia and FNL associates that have retained SALW. Reintegration has to include literacy, skills training, and long-term support, and special handling of women and children. Extensive consultation can lead to the design of appropriate incentive programs. Sufficient resources must be made available.

13. Community development programs target FNL associates (non-combatants).

14. In future demobilization drives, only those who hand in a working weapon be eligible to receive a benefit package.

15. Diplomatic and trade initiatives be implemented to curb the role of neighbouring states in transporting arms into Burundi.

16. Diplomatic and trade initiatives be undertaken in the area of Corporate Social Responsibility to pressure arms manufacturers to discontinue supplying weapons to fragile states.

17. Donors devote greater efforts to strengthening legislative mechanisms and providing disincentives for arms manufacturing in accordance with their commitment to the Principles for Engagement in Fragile States.
## APPENDIX A

### TABLE A.1
OECD GOOD POLICY GUIDELINES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GUIDELINE</th>
<th>OBSERVATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Commitment to the ‘Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness in Fragile States’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Commitment to the ‘Principles for Engagement in Fragile States’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A variety of assessment and diagnostic tools used in design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>A focus on demand as well as supply of SALW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Multi-sectoral and multi-level programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>‘Whole-of-Government’ or synchronized programming</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## TABLE A.1
OECD GOOD POLICY GUIDELINES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GUIDELINE</th>
<th>OBSERVATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7  Projects linked to national development frameworks</td>
<td>Avoid piecemeal activities by linking projects to an overall program strategy that is embedded in national development frameworks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8  Financial and managerial sustainability of initiatives</td>
<td>The financial and managerial sustainability of initiatives should be prioritized, given the long-term nature of the issue; stand-alone ‘train and equip’ projects, with their emphasis primarily on outputs, are avoided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9  Gender and age-sensitive approaches</td>
<td>Recognize and explicitly take into account the local level, where women and youth have important roles; be aware of different definitions of security; and the importance of gender and age-disaggregated research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Locally-owned, people-centred SSR and DDR</td>
<td>SSR and DDR initiatives acknowledge local perceptions and needs; high levels of participation by domestic stakeholders, including at the assessment, design and evaluation stages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Sequencing of civilian disarmament with SSR and DDR</td>
<td>Civilian disarmament campaigns are linked to how well SSR and DDR initiatives are progressing; public perceptions of police reform and improvements in security from SALW use are key; alignment of DDR with SSR prevents a ‘security vacuum.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Meeting short-term security and justice needs while building for long-term change</td>
<td>Immediate post-conflict needs in terms of local security and justice are met, while putting in place building blocks for long-term change; long-term change includes effective public security, regulatory frameworks for SALW, capacity to monitor and prevent illegal transfers, and destruction of surplus weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Reintegration seen from perspective of all actors</td>
<td>Reintegration is the most challenging DDR phase; the perspectives of the communities that have to re-absorb ex-combatants must be taken into account, in addition to the men, women and children being demobilized; traditional roles may no longer be available, acceptable, or possible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE A.2
**GOOD PRACTICE: LESSONS LEARNED**
*(from the case studies of Albania, Cambodia, El Salvador, Sierra Leone)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LESSONS LEARNED</th>
<th>OBSERVATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Sensitization and awareness-raising campaigns</td>
<td>Campaigns on the dangers of SALW, on new legislation, via radio and TV are key; in rural areas, use of radio is important.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Project design addresses root causes</td>
<td>Participatory research and understanding of root causes that drive people to acquire and use small arms is a prerequisite; followed by activities that directly address those root causes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Weapons-for-Development incentives make local sense</td>
<td>A participatory approach to determine the types of incentives to be offered is important; incentives linked to root causes have greater impact; context analysis determines whether incentives need to be individual, collective, or both.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Gendered approaches and participation by women</td>
<td>A gendered approach ensures that women’s roles are not overlooked; women are not absent from program design or implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Awareness of differences between urban and rural contexts</td>
<td>Commonly there are significant differences between rural and urban communities regarding perceptions and opinions on SALW, on civilian disarmament, and choices of incentives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Strengthening civil society organizations</td>
<td>Cooperation with civil society and the development of NGO capacity is important for the long-term; cooperation can take the form of involvement in policy and legislative development, partnerships in WfD program implementation, and partnerships in SALW awareness activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Participatory program development and flexible management</td>
<td>A participatory process involving substantial consultation with local and government counterparts and partners is important; as is managerial flexibility to respond to the political, security and operational dynamics in the field.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE A.2

**GOOD PRACTICE: LESSONS LEARNED**

*(from the case studies of Albania, Cambodia, El Salvador, Sierra Leone)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LESSONS LEARNED</th>
<th>OBSERVATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. Specialists responsible for project components</td>
<td><em>There is great advantage in having specialists in charge of different project components and activities.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. A functioning national authority and a national strategy in place</td>
<td><em>The effectiveness of a national body is measured at the practical and operational level; there must be a coherent national strategy to implement.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Civilian disarmament made difficult by continuing SALW transfers</td>
<td><em>An impact on the number of small arms in circulation is made difficult by legal and illegal transfers across borders.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. An active pro-disarmament coalition</td>
<td><em>A broad-based coalition that brings together academics, government officials, NGO, and private sector actors can have a national impact on awareness and action.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Alternative activities for youth</td>
<td><em>Activities such as sport events that target the most-at-risk age groups, and include small arms control messages.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Local-level initiatives</td>
<td><em>Initiatives to reduce armed violence are not restricted to the national level; they can also be carried out at the local (municipality, commune, district) level.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Socio-cultural expertise available to project staff</td>
<td><em>Socio-cultural expertise helps project staff working in complex contexts make informed decisions on appropriate research, design and implementation activities.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Technical expertise available to project staff</td>
<td><em>Beyond the ‘what’ needs to be done, project staff requires support from technical experts on the ‘how’ civilian disarmament needs to be done.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B
MAP OF BURUNDI

[Map of Burundi showing regional capitals, provinces, and boundaries.]
### APPENDIX C
### ACRONYMS USED IN THE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AID</td>
<td>Arms for development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Union Mission to Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVL</td>
<td>Armed violence lens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINUB</td>
<td>Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDCPA</td>
<td>Commission nationale du désarmement civil et de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petits calibres (Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Civilian Defence Forces (Sierra Leone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENAP</td>
<td>Centre d’Alerte et de Prévention des Conflits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD – FDD</td>
<td>Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces pour la défense de la démocratie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTDC</td>
<td>Commission technique de désarmement de la population civile (Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Danish Church Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC in French)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-ASAC</td>
<td>European Union Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons Program (Cambodia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDN</td>
<td>Force de défense nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRIP</td>
<td>Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité (Brussels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD DAC</td>
<td>OECD Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD DAC CPDC</td>
<td>OECD DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>Opération des Nations Unies pour le Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palipehutu – FNL</td>
<td>Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – Front national pour la libération</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNB</td>
<td>Police Nationale du Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSSM</td>
<td>Physical Security and Stockpile Management Project (MAG Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small arms and light weapons</td>
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<td>SMSAC</td>
<td>Strengthening Mechanisms for Small Arms Control Project (El Salvador)</td>
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<td>SNR</td>
<td>Service national de renseignement</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security sector reform</td>
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<td>UNIDIR</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research</td>
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<td>WfD</td>
<td>Weapons for Development initiatives</td>
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<td>WoG</td>
<td>Whole-of-Government approach to initiatives</td>
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</table>
REFERENCES


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